

Social Order

CREDIT UNION JUBILEE

Gerard L. McLaughlin

December, 1959
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Francis P. Canavan

POLITICS AND CATHOLICISM

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Leo C. Brown

NEW LABOR LAW

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John Blewett

JOHN DEWEY, SALVATIONIST

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BOOKS • COMMENT

MONTHLY OF NATIONAL JESUIT SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER

Social Order

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... just a few things:

FATHER BLEWETT'S APPRAISAL of John Dewey for the centenary of his birth inevitably emphasizes the philosopher's preoccupation with the scientific method. Such concern for the concrete, the experiential, the verifiable is commonly deemed to be typically American; it has generally been deplored by Catholics who find substituting methodology for metaphysics disastrously superficial. This sort of procedure was egregiously illustrated by the late Dr. Alfred C. Kinsey who, confusing the *is* for the *ought*, elaborated moral standards from simple statistics of sexual performance.

Nevertheless, only at the peril of self-stultification does Catholic social thinking scamp empirical examination. It might, further, be underlined in this context that Christianity is essentially a religion appealing to verifiable historical assertions, a faith in facts.

In the light of the assertions of the Christian creed, history is no longer the dreary, witless turning of the sorrowful wheel of meaningless time, without beginning or end. At a definite point in the historical record, there was a decisive intrusion of the divine into mankind's career, giving a direction and a purpose to humanity's pilgrimage through time. It is not the least lesson of Christmas, this refurbishing of our sense of reverence for the real.

"At different times and in various fashions God formerly spoke to our forefathers," declared Saint Paul. "In these days He has spoken to us by His Son." Of the personality and activities of Jesus we have details sufficient to evoke (but never to exhaust) the ab-

sorbing love of the saint and the patient labors of the scholar. We have the clear concreteness of His coming listed in the exact language of the Christmas Martyrology:

... in the hundred and ninety-fourth Olympiad, in the year seven hundred and fifty-two from the founding of the city of Rome, in the forty-second year of the Empire of Octavius Augustus, when the whole world was at peace. . . . Jesus Christ is born in Bethlehem of Juda.

Verbum caro factum est. It was as no mindless neo-Hegelian Absolute but with the firm flesh of Jew of the conquered Roman Province that God entered history, like us in all things save sin.

Our spiritual lives will be the more solidly sincere, our concern for our fellows the more effective, the larger becomes our understanding of the concrete reality of Jesus Christ as an historical person and as present today by his self-identification with "the least of these my brethren."

Geographers can readily calculate the latitude and longitude of a silver star sunk in the stone floor of the dilapidated basilica at Bethlehem. "Here," it asserts in Latin, "Christ was born." To this spot, then, at Christmas time people, even today, pilgrimage through battle lines. For the Christian mind is drawn toward the real and the concrete which were cherished by Jesus Christ. It is, of course, by faith that we know that the altar also cradles the Reality of Bethlehem. In their Christmas Masses, kneeling before that same Reality, the Fathers of the Institute of Social Order, as in the past, will be mindful of the hopes of their friends.

E. D., S.J.

JOHN DEWEY,

"For the way to worship God, while the daylight lasts, is to work; the service of God, the only 'divine service' is the helping of our fellows; I want to show that this is the simplest, blesseddest thing in the human world."¹

IF ONE WERE LOOKING for a text to head a panegyric commemorating the centenary of John Dewey's birth, this snatch from the first book he ever published could well serve the purpose. *Selections from the Writings of George MacDonald or Helps for Weary Souls*, a collection of inspirational passages from the writings of the Scotch novelist and evangelist, vividly depicts in its sub title and contents the element of dedication to human well-being which marked Dewey's career from his early teaching at the University of Michigan in the 1880s to his death in 1952. Though intended for a far different audience than his *Experience and Nature* (1926) and his monumental *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), it betrays the same desire to bring the fruits of study and research to the liberation and salvation of mankind. Adverting to the Dewey anniversary, it may not be out of place to

focus on this facet of his many-sided personality. Among other reasons for my emphasis on this point rather than on, say, Dewey's work as a social reformer, is that it may help to make more understandable to Catholics the appeal of atheistic humanism to so many of our contemporaries. Since several excellent studies of Dewey are available, the reader may be referred to them for a more balanced appraisal and more detailed exposition.²

There is a certain risk in highlighting the salvationist drive in Dewey. To his friends and followers it may seem condescending. To his opponents it may seem sentimental, if not downright misleading. In defense of this emphasis I would suggest that, if Catholics are rightly concerned about the incredible ignorance of their beliefs encountered among American intellectuals, they should be somewhat eager not to retali-

¹ T. R. Knox, New York, 1885, p. 9.

Father Blewett teaches Education at Sophia University, Tokyo.

² Sidney Hook's *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait*, John Day, New York, 1939, and George Geiger's *John Dewey in Perspective*, Oxford, New York, 1958, are two of the best general sketches of Dewey's philosophy. To supplement these appraisals by admirers of Dewey, Morton White's *The Origins of Dewey's Instrumentalism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1943, and the relevant section of Father Neil McCluskey's *Public Schools and Moral Education*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958, are suggested.

philosopher of the scientific method

SALVATIONIST

JOHN BLEWETT, S.J.

ate in kind. If the humanistic intent behind Dewey's lifework is once seen, it becomes easier to study his works (which are not conspicuous for their lucidity) with the care and thoroughness they deserve.

In his first year of university teaching at Ann Arbor Dewey delivered a chapel talk to some of the Christian students on "The Obligation to Knowledge of God." In it he announced a theme that remained constant in his teaching and writing during the rest of his life: man's urgent need to unify his knowing and willing activities. "We know," he insisted, "only what we most *want* to know. To know or not to know is not a colorless intellectual thing, involving no part of man's moral nature. It is an essentially moral thing."³ At this early stage in his career Dewey was still a Christian and already concerned with the split between word and deed, theory and practice, which he regarded as the bane of modern man. A rapid glance at his criticisms of earlier philosophical systems will clarify that all failed, in one way or other, to satisfy his belief that man's knowing proceeds

from, and must be intertwined with, his own active desire to make sense of the universe.

British philosophers from Locke to Spencer, Dewey consistently maintained, distorted man into a passive recipient of impressions to be sorted out and combined in his head without any need for the assistance of volitional activities. The medieval scholastics (whose works Dewey either never studied directly or else badly misunderstood) did not actively seek out the truth; they relied on ecclesiastical authorities to fill their syllogistic machines with the premises they churned into conclusions. Kant maimed man by seeing him as a being whose desires habitually take the low road in isolation from the high road of reason.

Dewey's skill in finding class origins for epistemological theories that he excoriated has driven critics to distraction and has at times distressed some of his disciples. During World War I he argued that the Kantian split between desires and reason had served to prepare the German people to rely on military leaders to tell them what they should desire. Plato and Aristotle, differing though they did on important particulars, were united (he held) in the more consequential point of extolling the theorizing of the leisured class and con-

³ "The Obligation to Knowledge of God," *The Monthly Bulletin of the Students' Christian Association of the University of Michigan*, VI (November, 1884) p. 24.

demning the practical activities of artisans and workers to a realm of meaninglessness forever divorced from the world of real knowledge.

It requires no great philosophical acumen to pick large holes in Dewey's canvas of intellectual history, although, it must be admitted, it is a rare Deweyan who has considered the advisability of turning to this task. But behind the reckless technique of assigning philosophical guilt by class-association lay a conviction that mankind had been despoiled by advocates of a divorce between knowing and doing, thought and desire. Dewey conceived of himself as the good samaritan binding up the wounds of mankind or, to use an image taken from an autobiographical account, as John the Baptist clearing the way for a happier era to come.⁴ Once restored to health, man would be able to run his course without excessive fear of plague or pillage.

Scientific method

Dewey's ardent championing of scientific method as the *only* road leading to mankind's liberation from obscurantism and class-divisions must be seen against this larger background to be rightly understood. In scientific activity, as he explained it, willing in the form of selection of data and of the hypothesis to be tested, is fused with intelligence. Nor is this selective element haphazard or irresponsible. It is linked with existential conditions by the fact that it is triggered in observable situations by trouble or disequilibrium of some sort which calls attention to itself. Hence, scientific activity is not to be

confused with busy-work, for it is directed to a solution of a problem for, ultimately, the betterment of the human community. When malnutrition and epidemics, for example, plague mankind, they naturally cause concern in the human community and, hence, are selected for detailed study, unless power blocs with a vested interest in human woe obscure the issue or by threat and force block the needed inquiries.

The true scientist, Dewey maintained, *wants* to solve a real problem *in the most intelligent way* possible. Hence, his activity is highly moral (or virtuous) and will issue in salvific knowledge for man. *Fides quaerens intellectum*, the belief that understanding of natural processes is good—what brief formula can better describe the scientist's patient probing of nature's continuing self-revelation?

It was about 1892-1893 that Dewey definitely broke with what may loosely be called neo-Hegelianism and what he believed to be its theological counterpart, Christianity. It is significant that one of his clearest statements on scientific method as the royal road to truth is found in an address on the need to "reconstruct" the Christian understanding of revelation. "It is because science represents a method of truth, to which, so far as we can discover, no limits whatsoever can be put, that it is necessary for the church to reconstruct its doctrines of revelation and inspiration," he asserted.⁵ Revelation, both in Protestant and Catholic interpretations, was a communication of God for the uplifting and salvation of mankind. Could less be claimed for its replacement or, better,

⁴ "From Absolutism to Experimentalism" in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, edited by George P. Adams and W. P. Montague, Macmillan, New York, 1930, Vol. II, pp. 13-27.

⁵ "Reconstruction," *The Monthly Bulletin of the Students' Christian Association of the University of Michigan*, XV (June, 1894) p. 154.

for its continuation? To tap the riches of nature for the good of man is a godly work indeed!

Two of the numerous liberating potentialities of scientific method, which graphically underscore the human good to which Dewey always looked, may be singled out for specific mention. In a portentously entitled article published very shortly after the address referred to above, Dewey deplored the willingness of parents to resort to threats and thongs to bring their children to obey. "Chaos in Moral Education" was an apt title for the situation which Dewey claimed to see.⁶ One piece of evidence, testifying to the unscientific status of moral teaching within the home, was the questionnaire from which Dewey derived his conclusions on the matter. It unveiled the domestic tyranny which only enlightenment on the true method of moral teaching could topple. It is against this image of maltreated children that Dewey's occasional bursts of violence against parental authority should be seen.

Another locus of adult tyranny to which the benefits of scientific study should be brought was the elementary school classroom. Adult inattention to children's interests and their neglect of the fact that industrialization and urbanization were creating a new society had resulted in a curriculum characterized by its lack of relation to societal developments and in methods of teaching which reduced children to the status of robots ticking off answers learned by rote. This indictment of the educational system of the late 19th century is familiar to all readers of Dewey's *The School and Society* (1900), *The Child*

and the Curriculum (1902), and *Democracy and Education* (1916). One aspect of this general indictment is especially illuminating; it is the charge that the development of scientific method has antiquated the stress on the three r's in the early grades. Assailing the stress on reading in the early grades as the "fetich of primary education," Dewey called for the introduction of nature studies and of manual tasks into the first three grades so that children would have interests to spur their desire to learn to read at the fourth-grade level. A series of arguments to this effect, based on the physiology of eye and hand development, is nested in the much more consequential plea that socio-economic changes demand the change. "The significance attached to reading and writing, as primary and fundamental instruments of culture, has shrunk proportionately as the immanent intellectual life of society has quickened and multiplied," he wrote in 1898.⁷ The quickening force, of course, is scientific method.

No longer is society so dependent on the authority of the printed and spoken word. Hence, the young child should be prepared as early as possible to learn to uncover truth directly by the aid of scientific method. Thus, he is protected against the vagaries of custom and the patronizing, if not domineering, attitude of societal authorities. In a very real sense, scientific method in Dewey's understanding of man serves the same purpose for the individual as the ecstatic vision of the Good does for the elite in Plato's planned society. When the common man, educated correctly from childhood on, has learned to make his judgments on all matters in a scientific

⁶ "Chaos in Moral Education," *Popular Science Monthly*, XLV (August, 1894) pp. 433-443.

⁷ "The Primary Education Fetich," *Forum*, XXV (June, 1898) p. 317.

spirit, on that day will kings have become philosophers and philosophers kings.

A suspicion found in many cultures and memorialized in myth and literature would have it that the gods are jealous of their gifts and do not wish to share them with men. If a Prometheus snatches their fire, he must pay for his rashness, whether the vulture that feeds on his entrails be interpreted as physical punishment or as the pangs of a tormented conscience. A complaint that is echoed in every age is that the gods recline on their couches far from toiling man and care not for his toils. If occasionally they interrupt their revelings to tour the world of man, they spread blight at every stage. If Paris opts for Aphrodite, he unleashes the fury of Athene. And then, if one has placated all the gods of his acquaintance, can he be sure that some unknown god may not be stirred to anger at having been overlooked? Better, then, to erect an altar to the *deus ignotus* and seal off attack from no matter what quarter. If we keep Prometheus, Paris, and the unknown god of the Areopagus in the back of our mind as we read Dewey, his antitheism and his attacks on the "supernatural" may be seen as something quite different from the twisted desire of the village atheist to spoil the innocence of children. Until Olympus is shown to be uninhabited, mankind cannot be totally redeemed.

Three features

I will select three features of Dewey's campaign for comment in this connection: his polemic against divine providence; his attacks on Christianity for leading man to excessive introspection

and subjectivism; his sallies against the dehumanizing consequences of an affirmation of the existence of an "Absolute." (I use "Absolute" instead of "God" because that term, with its overtones of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians, is the one Dewey used most frequently and because it may suggest that Dewey probably never conceived of God as the unlimited tripersonal Creator of Catholic theology or as the fullness of being of scholastic philosophy.)

1. *Polemic against providence.* When you say that God directs all things sweetly to their ends, have you formulated a proposition that throws light on human history? If God chastizes whom He loves and if the wicked often escape punishment, how is the just man to be distinguished from the unjust? An earthquake shatters the lives of saint and sinner alike, while both sides in a war appeal for victory to the same God. Then, too, if a group identifies itself as the agent of providence in history, cannot this turn firmness into vindictiveness and concern for social order into a hounding of heretics? The "God wills it" of the crusader encouraged many a sword to leap from its scabbard in pursuit of tainted aims. Christian colonial powers with their tacit appeal to their calling by providence to tutor benighted peoples have scattered perhaps more than they have gathered. *Apropos* of France's policy in Turkey after World War I, Dewey tartly remarked that it insisted on protecting abroad the Christian schools that were not allowed at home. And comparing the relatively good fortune of unprotected Jews in Turkey with the suffering of Armenians and Greeks, pawns of Christian protectors, he commented: "Unbidden the thought comes to mind: Happy the mi-

nority which has no Christian nation to protect it."⁸

Problem of evil

"Providence" can be manipulated for decidedly inhuman ends. "Providence" on the lips of pious people can distract men from energetically tackling problems which cry for a solution. When plague and famine are considered providential dispensations, men allow themselves to be plucked like flies instead of turning to discriminating study in order to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies. Commenting at the height of World War I on the meaning of progress, Dewey lashed out at all teachings used to support belief in its inevitability. Any philosophy, he wrote "which trusts the direction of human affairs to nature, or Providence, or evolution, or manifest destiny—that is to say, to accident" issues in a laissez-faire attitude toward social evils.⁹ The popular belief in evolution with its corollary of "automatic and wholesale progress in human affairs" was merely a transposition into a different key of earlier beliefs in providence, he stated, with the significant advantage of being popular.¹⁰

Dewey's low opinion of Herbert Spencer, expressed frequently in the days when Spencer was one of the popular prophets in the Anglo-Saxon world, derived in part from his belief that Spencer did not understand the meaning of evolution, for to him and his popularizers evolution tended "to 'a single, far-off divine event—to a finality, a fix-

ity', " to a state similar to the heaven of believers in providence.¹¹ Dewey's frequent sallies against a natural law philosophy, it may be added in passing, stemmed from his belief that, in failing to provide a method for directed social change, it conspired with teachings on providence to a sanctioning of the *status quo* and a confirmation in grace of the "haves."

2. *Christianity, all of introspection and subjectivism.* A discussion of this point should be introduced with the reminder that, in his opposition to introspection, Dewey did not countenance impulsive, non-reflective conduct. Pages redolent of Epictetus or Ignatius of Loyola on the value of close scrutiny of one's intended actions can be found in any of his major tracts on ethical decision-making. Reflectiveness, however, is one thing. Anxious self-analysis is another. This morbid attention to one's inner self fostered by Christianity, Dewey claimed, leads to indecision and moral torpor. In his first book-length publication after his repudiation of neo-Hegelianism, Dewey denounced the "over-subjective ethics of one-sided individualism, fostered by evangelical Protestantism" for its insistence on the need of obeying one's conscience without at the same time stressing the necessity of acting from an instructed conscience. "The Socratic identification of wisdom and virtue," he continued, "is much nearer the truth than the modern view which, holding to knowing the good and still doing the evil, substitutes a conventional state of being informed . . . for vital intelligence."¹²

⁸ "The Turkish Tragedy," *Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World, Mexico, China, Turkey, New Republic*, New York, 1929, p. 201. This essay originally appeared in 1924.

⁹ "Progress," *Characters and Events*, Holt, New York, 1929, Vol. II, p. 827. This essay was originally published in 1916.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 827.

¹¹ "Herbert Spencer," *Characters and Events*, Holt, New York, 1929, Vol. I, p. 60. This essay prepared originally in 1904.

¹² *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus*, Register, Ann Arbor, 1894, pp. 135-136.

It is not at all unlikely that Dewey, who was a popular professor at Ann Arbor, encountered students whose instructions from overprotective parents on the dangers of dicing and dancing and on the presence of Satan in convivial brews needlessly forced them into ethical dilemmas. College administrators of today may sigh for the good old days when students could enjoy themselves without benefit of cocktail and highball, but perhaps the relative abstemiousness of college youth 60 and 70 years ago was bought at too high a price. How many consciences were falsified by elders who could blandly assure their children that Jesus turned water into grape juice at Cana, for surely alcohol and holiness are incompatible!

In an encyclopedia article on the development of ethical theory in the West, written in 1904 (the year he moved from the University of Chicago to Columbia University), Dewey singled out as the outstanding feature of the patristic-medieval period (from the fifth to the fifteenth century) the subordination of the ethically good to the obligatory. A survival of this understanding can be found in modern thought, he remarked, in the belief that ethical decision-making is focused in the struggle between good and evil in one's soul, a struggle characterized by anxious searchings for correct motives.¹³

Such self-scrutiny leads to all the tricks and turnings of casuistry, a type of intellectual juggling unworthy of free men, and to a disregard of the consequences of one's actions. Dewey's lifelong contention that the goodness of a moral act must be determined from its

consequences has been so frequently misunderstood by follower and foe alike that it should be emphasized that it was directed primarily against various types of intuitionist ethics claiming to have access to first principles not derived from the experiential aspects of human action. These systems of ethics deriving, so Dewey would have it, from Aristotle, Cicero, the scholastics, Kant, and the Scottish common sense school, and used by Christians to buttress their theology, support the popular belief that conscience is a psychic jack-in-the-box ready to spring up with the right answer if only an individual is sincere. It follows, Dewey repeated in season and out of season, that intuitionists slight careful, factual studies of moral situations in favor of appeals to the "inner light" and purification of motives.

Religious subjectivism

Dewey's desire to protect children from excessive religious subjectivism stands out conspicuously in an address he delivered at the first annual convention of the Religious Education Association in 1903. In connection with his theme of psychological growth and successive expansion of experience, he pleaded with his audience not to conceive of the child as an adult in lower case, a creature to be imbued with adult notions of sin and redemption. Such "premature experience with matters which are not really understood or vitally experienced," he continued in a passage which may well have autobiographical overtones, "is not without effect in promoting skepticism and crises of frightful doubt. It is a serious moment when an earnest soul wakes up to the fact that it has been passively accepting and reproducing ideas and feel-

¹³See "Ethics," [Encyclopedia] *Americana*, edited by F. C. Beach, Scientific American, New York, 1903-1905, Vol. VI, unpagcd.

ings which it now recognizes are not a part of its own being."¹⁴ Catholics who are unfamiliar with the phenomenon of the "conversion experience" and the emotionalism surrounding it in not a few Protestant groups may be puzzled by such a remark, but they may find an analogue for the misguided zeal Dewey was condemning in the type of teacher who insists with eight-year old first communicants that it is a *horrible, horrible* sin to touch the Host and at the same time that It should not be permitted to get lodged in the roof of one's mouth or who (to use an example I recently encountered) forbids whistling in the school lavatory for the reason that "it is a holy place."

The frightfulness of such an experience, from Dewey's point of view, can be gauged from his appraisal of its effects on even the sincere persons who try to retain their first beliefs through and after their awakening. Even such people "are likely to carry scars from the struggles through which they have passed," for "they have undergone a shock and upheaval from which every youth ought, if possible, to be spared" (italics mine).¹⁵ Though Dewey was concurrently extolling conflict and tension as the biopsychical mechanisms triggering thought and reflective action, he was firmly convinced that this type of religious struggle could issue only in evil. Since Christianity, as he seems to have understood it, was built on the premises of man's inherent sinfulness and his need for redemption and since awareness of sinfulness was so frequently accompanied by feelings of, shall we

say, neurotic guilt and psychological stupor, one sure way to break the vicious cycle would be to cut off the current. The Deweyan version of *écrasez l'infame* should be seen against this background.

3. *The Absolute, dehumanizing power.* One of the few passages in the collected works of Aquinas in which his anger can be detected occurs in the *De Unitate Intellectus*, a treatise directed specifically against the Averroistic contention that individual men do not have a personal intellect but are linked through their imaginations with the single, separate intellect of the human universe. Such a puppet, Thomas argued, would not be free nor responsible. Nor would he be immortal. Such a puppet would not be human.

Though the separated intellect of 13th century Averroists did not enjoy prominence in 19th century England, books were written and discussions raged about its close relative, the Absolute or universal consciousness of the neo-Hegelians. In admittedly inexplicable fashion the Absolute manipulated human sensations and impulses to construct the world of intelligible and moral reality. Some of Dewey's early writings were devoted to an exposition and defense of this philosophy of the Absolute, especially as it was formulated by Thomas Hill Green, a man whom he openly admired and whose works he looked on as the best philosophical defense of liberal Christianity. After repudiating Christianity and its philosophical counterpart, Dewey seized on the real weaknesses in these accounts of the Absolute and dismissed as illusory every attempt to account for the universe in "supernatural" or theistic terms. Running through nearly almost all of his later references to the Absolute is a

¹⁴"Religious Education as Conditioned by Modern Psychology and Pedagogy," *Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, First Annual Convention*, Office of the Association, Chicago, 1903, p. 63.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 64.

thread of almost tangible resentment against the reduction of man and the visible universe to a mere phase in its on-sweep, a reduction inescapably connected with the philosophy of the Absolute.

One statement of his resentment takes the form that human life is deprived of seriousness and meaning if only in the Absolute can true meaning be found. Moral and physical evil cannot be accounted for, much less diminished, if they are necessary for the progressive unfolding of the Absolute. The man who many years after the death of two of his children could not recall the events without stirrings of sorrow was not to be put off with declarations that at least in the Absolute the reason for such tragedies is clear.¹⁶ "What we need," he wrote a few years after his son's death "is a reconsideration of the facts of struggle, disappointment, change, consciousness of limitation, which will show *them*, as they actually are experienced *by us* (not by something called The Absolute) to be significant, worthy and helpful. Any other reading of human sufferings would reduce man to hedonistic despair," he continued in one of his most memorable passages, one that must be quoted in full for its impact to be felt.

On the contrary, if we are fragmentary and finite in such a way that our meanings and realizations are not presented in and to us, but only to and in the Absolute, what boots either the Absolute, or the struggle! Let us eat, drink, and be merry—let us glean the satisfactions of

our passing life, for as to serious meanings, only the Absolute knows what they mean, as to serious efforts, only the Absolute experiences their realization—and, since he is Absolute, we cannot rob him of that in any case, nor will he grudge us such pleasures as we can snatch as we hurry along. Omar Khayyam knew such philosophy long ago.¹⁷

These are not the words of a man who wishes that God did not exist so that he will be accountable only to himself. They are a cry from the same depths that Lucretius knew, and they are salted with the same bitterness as the *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum* of that foe of superstition.

Dewey was not bedeviled by the existence of evils in the world. Indeed, the impression of a sympathetic interpreter is that his excessive "healthy-mindedness" and his failure to advert to the frustrating and distressing side of human living dates him.¹⁸ I would suggest that Dewey's thinness here and his inability to account in other than environmental terms for the fact of moral evil is attributable to his conclusion that such questions defy searching analysis and solution. Time and time again as he nears a discussion, not of the setting for, or the consequences of, a free choice, but of its very nature, he veers away into safer waters. Of one thing, however, he was certain. No explanation involving an Absolute can stand the light of day. His final judgment on the matter, written not too many years after his rejection of neo-Hegelianism and repeated in different words on many subsequent occasions, occurs in the second of two reviews of the Gifford Lectures of Josiah Royce.

¹⁶Sidney Hook records that Dewey "mourned with a deep, and almost womanly, intensity that was hardly effected by the passage of years" the death of two sons, Morris and Gordon. Each died in Europe during a family vacation, the former (so far as I can determine) in 1894, the latter in 1904. See Sidney Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey," *Commentary*, XIV (September, 1952), p. 245.

¹⁷Review of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being*, *Philosophical Review*, IX (May, 1900), p. 323.

¹⁸Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

But how can choice, real evil, and the making of things better or worse really exist in a world which is eternally present as complete to an Absolute Being? In such a world, must not every apparent choice be really an act eternally done and known in the Absolute, just as it is, with no possibility of its being otherwise? In such a world, it would seem either that there is no evil, or that evil is a means by which the Absolute wins in its own perfection, and hence in no sense the doing of the individual.¹⁹

Even a casual reader of Dewey's more popular works knows how burning his words become in a condemnation of anything approaching a mentality of "the end justifies the means." This "Jesuit maxim," as he refers to it in one of his major works,²⁰ leads to moral recklessness and to a type of fanaticism symbolized by Moloch. The fact that the Absolute seemingly played the game according to this maxim proved, Dewey insisted over and over again, not that the maxim is right but that the Absolute is a fiction.

I would like to conclude this somewhat impressionistic account of the influential "philosopher of American democracy" with a few questions, germane to, but not rising directly from, what has preceded.

1. Why is it that Dewey, for all his dedication to fair play and to open-mindedness, was never able to report, much less to consider worthwhile, the bearings of scholastic philosophy on problems which, in his opinion, demanded an answer from modern men? When queried in 1926 on his attitude toward scholastic philosophy, he suggested that its representatives make it understandable in modern language to "outsiders." He suggested, too, that

they thoroughly acquaint themselves with the thought and history of the 18th and 19th centuries.²¹ How far have scholastic philosophers advanced along these lines? A careful student of Thomistic psychology as related to learning theory notes that with few exceptions "almost no thorough scholarly work has been published" by Thomists on the point and that while some work has been done in presenting relevant theories in doctrinal fashion "little or none of the evidence of experience upon which their truth rests is given."²² Would similar conclusions be valid for many other areas of importance to modern man?

2. Have Catholic universities been open for symposia and conferences on truly controversial issues where free and frank discussion by informed people can be carried on? Have they made attempts to secure funds from foundations for such symposia? Or have attempts frequently been made only to be rejected?

3. What explains the uncommon ability of Americans in controversy to fail to understand their opponent and, hence, to talk beside the point? Is the you-talk-while-I-don't-listen mentality abetted by fear that one will discover that one's ready answers sound rather hollow in the give-and-take of discussion? If so, is the Deweyan emphasis on *methods* of problem-solving (perhaps more akin to intellectual habits than might at first blush appear) still relevant in education, especially, perhaps, in Catholic education?

²¹See Dewey's response in *Present day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism*, edited by John S. Zybura, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1925, pp. 29-31.

²²Tad Walter Guize, S.J., *The Analogy of Learning: An Essay toward a Thomistic Psychology of Learning*, (unpublished Master's thesis, St. Louis University, 1959), p. 23.

¹⁹Review of Royce, *ibid.*, p. 400.

²⁰See his *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1929 Modern Library edition of the 1922 original, p. 240.

Fifty years ago in Manchester,

Credit Union

GERARD L. McLAUGHLIN, S.J.

WHILE MARX WAS ENGAGED in writing his *Das Kapital*, the first modest credit union was founded in Germany by Friedrich Raiffeisen. A local burgomeister, Raiffeisen provided his community with the means to save and to borrow on a thrifty basis; from such an association grew the present day gigantic structure called the credit union movement.

Fifty years after Raiffeisen's first efforts, another pioneer in the movement, Alphonse Desjardins of Quebec, organized his *caisses populaires* to help his fellow Canadians in their economic distress. Soon, in 1909, he was called upon by his American neighbors to establish the first credit union in the United States, in Manchester, New Hampshire. So steadily did the movement grow in this country that when the Credit Union National Association was founded in 1934 it soon became the focal point for credit union organization work all over the world.

From such beginnings, the credit

union movement has matured into a full-grown economic force. More than a thousand delegates from all over the world gathered in Boston last May to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the United States' first credit union. Citizens of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South America, Jamaica and the far-off Fiji Islands took their places beside their American brothers in paying tribute to a movement which has meant economic well-being to millions. As a distinct economic subdivision of the general activity of cooperation, credit unionism has come to manhood.

The movement boasts of 11 million active members in the United States and another two million in other areas of the world. Combined assets now total almost \$5 billion and it is estimated that they will be close to \$15 billion in another ten years. During the first decade after the war, assets multiplied six-fold while membership tripled. There are now 26,000 credit unions in the world; their number is increasing each day.

Modern day credit unions had suffered a mongrel-like beginning in Germany and Italy during the last century. Raiffeisen and Scheultze-Delitsch structured their organization along different lines. As a result, present day credit unions in Europe operate uniquely; they

Assistant Director of the Caribbean Social Action Centre, Kingston, Jamaica, Father McLaughlin last summer made a two-months' tour of the Midwest under the sponsorship of the Credit Union National Association and the Cooperative League of the U.S.A.

New Hampshire . . .

Jubilee

are financially sound but they differ from their Western counterparts in methods and philosophy. It was Desjardins of Quebec who gave sound beginnings to credit union organization here in North America. After years of study, he adopted the principles of the cooperatives of Rochdale and combined them with the recognition of the financial and personal habits of North Americans.

Basically, these operating principles have remained the same during the 50 years that followed. A standard definition of the modern day credit union declares it to be:

A cooperative organization established by a group of people having a common bond through which they pool their savings and through which loans may be made to members of the group from the common funds when such borrowing is wise and necessary for providential and productive purposes.

Both state and federal governments have long recognized the right and ability of the average citizen to conduct the affairs of his credit union. All but a few states, and the new states of Hawaii and Alaska, have credit union laws. In 1934 the federal legislature established a law for credit unions with the supervisory agency incorporated into the present Department of Health, Edu-

cation and Welfare. Organizers of credit unions have a choice of a federal or a state charter; each has its advantages and disadvantages. Under this enabling legislation, credit unions have manifested a vitality heretofore unknown in the movement.

The need for such an instrument as a credit union becomes more apparent with the passing of each business day. Consumer credit now is an integral part of the economy. In dollars involved, consumer credit in the United States amounts to \$48,394,000,000, a sum equal to the amount in the federal budget allocated to the defense of the nation. The average American family consigns twenty per cent of the take-home pay for the payment of credit obligations. And the wage earner is paying it off through hundreds of schemes of budget financing.

Of these various schemes, credit unions, even though in their infancy, are already making 15 per cent of the personal (not real estate) loans in this country. The percentage will undoubtedly increase. It is not surprising, then, to encounter the statement by the syndicated business columnist, Sylvia Porter, that credit unions "are growing faster percentagewise than any other lending institution in our land . . . their growth is a phenomenon."

Competition in the field has been keen and has been generally provided by the Morris Plan, savings and loans associations, banking institutions and most of all by personal finance companies. These small loan companies, admittedly charging sometimes as high as 24 to 36 per cent for their loans, are multiplying rapidly in their own right. In the halls of the legislature, spokesmen for the small loan companies make the loudest

protests when credit unions are granted legal concessions.

In contrast to other lending institutions, credit unions provide a unique insurance plan for the borrower. Through CUNA (Credit Union National Association) Mutual Insurance, each affiliated credit union has life insurance and loan protection insurance. Should a member die, his loan dies with him and his survivors are paid double the amount of his savings. CUNA Mutual boasts of monthly claim payments to credit union members amounting to more than \$1 million.

Collection-wise, credit union statistics show an over-all average default on loans of less than one fifth of one per cent over a period of a half-century. This amazing record is attributed to the credit union policy of granting loans to known individuals on the basis of character and record.

Grass root democracies

Credit unions organize themselves on a cooperative nonprofit basis; they are grass root democracies, governed by boards of directors elected annually by the membership. All activities are subject to review by the members; every effort is made, therefore, to educate the individual members in the philosophy and financial policy of the credit union. Basically, the principles are the same as those given the world by the Rochdale cooperators in the middle of the last century.

In most of the world, credit unions and cooperatives are closely united, both in philosophy and in activity. In Puerto Rico and South America, for example, credit unions and co-ops conduct their affairs under single boards of supervision; government departments are

named to include both credit unions and co-ops. This situation, however, is not verified in the United States. Historically, the credit unions and the cooperatives had separate beginnings. Born of separate parentage, growing under separate schooling, they have remained apart in their adult lives. Although CUNA and most state leagues of credit unions are dues-paying members of the Cooperative League of the USA, there is little actual union between them and the cooperative movement. To aggravate the disunion, resolutions are often introduced among credit union leagues to sever all connection with the Cooperative League.

This seems unfortunate. For, surely a credit union is a cooperative, basically nonprofit, dedicated to the mutual help of its members. The mushroom growth of credit unions, however, has prevented any long-term thinking in this country along a cooperative line. As defined by former Congressman Jerry Voorhis of California, President of the Cooperative League of the USA, a cooperative endeavor is: "voluntary action by a group of self-governing equals to gain ends and goals of mutual benefit and value to the group as a whole and to the different units making it up."



A cooperative, as Mr. Voorhis puts it, is a perfect economic application of the principle of democracy, providing a contrast to the top-heavy, monolithic structure of most business enterprises.

Credit unions and cooperatives ultimately are in competition with the profit-making philosophy of the individual enterprise. But both are quick to admit that there is room on the economic front for these conflicting viewpoints. Cooperatives and credit unions are evidence, however, that people can and do run their own affairs in such a way that mutual benefit is the main purpose.



The growth of Adult Education programs in the recent past has opened new doors to the cooperatives and credit unions. Seminars, institutes, educational material of all types are organized and disseminated by educators to help the members of both camps make better co-operators of themselves. Adult educators in union with faculties from various state universities influence annually thousands of American citizens who meet—especially during the summer months—to study either cooperatives or credit unions. The power in the hands of these educators to shape the economic future of both organizations, and hence their impact on the country, is immense.

While distinct, credit unions and cooperatives often resemble each other in their efforts to help their members. At the present time, credit unions are engaging in some small degree in cooperative housing. Some credit unions plan group health plans with credit union

funds and credit union membership as a basis of the organization. Cooperatives, on the other hand, use credit unions as one service to members and fellow co-operators. Peculiarly enough, some now-defunct cooperative ventures remain on the scene as million-dollar credit unions. There are cooperative groceries that provide nothing but savings and loan programs in a credit union setting. When the grocery failed, the board of directors turned the venture into a credit union; the name includes "cooperative" but the present function is solely that of the credit union.

In foreign lands, few occasions for such contradictions exist. All credit unions are cooperatives and *vice-versa*. Thus, credit unions are not so timid in leaping into cooperative housing or cooperative medical plans. Leaders interested in both cooperative and credit union organizations join forces at seminars and institutes arranged by each group. It is hoped that unity will be achieved in order to provide the strongest possible educational and economic structure for cooperation in all fields.

Religious-minded leadership

Unity may well be advanced in the cooperative movement by the combined efforts of the highly-principled people who guide the movement. One soon learns that a deep spirit of Christianity and self-sacrifice prevails among many co-operators. This becomes more understandable when one discovers that a large number of both credit union and cooperative leaders have had theological training, Catholic or Protestant. Educational directors, particularly, have records of theological studies interrupted by careers in cooperative work. Jerry

Voorhis at one time was a theological student; credit union education directors and individual treasurer-managers can boast of theological training. They have apparently found this movement a spiritual challenge and, though they seldom mention their background of theology, it is evident in their thinking and their devotion to the job.

Catholic priests also have taken prominent part in the movement¹. A line can be drawn across the globe and at each few thousand miles one can mention the name of a missionary priest, both overseas and in the United States, who is prominent in credit union and cooperative work. The line could well begin with the cooperative work of St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia. There, the late Monsignor M. M. Coady, Father Jimmy Tompkins and others pioneered in the work of integrating ethical teaching with social action. From their work has sprung the thinking of thousands of "cooperators" all over the world.

Training for missionaries

Recently a new addition has been made to the spirituality of the movement. Catholic lay mission groups incorporate credit union and cooperative training as part of their pre-departure curricula. The Grail Movement takes time to give professional training to students; and AID of Paterson, New Jersey (Association for International Development) now is considering credit union and cooperative training as standard procedure for its mission helpers. Without doubt, the Catholic Church is pre-eminent in its devotion to cooperative philosophy in the mission field; cooperative and credit union leaders of all

faiths are quick to pay tribute to church leaders. The tribute, perhaps, is due in an ever greater degree to intelligent, social-minded lay Catholics who have staffed not only their secular-oriented credit unions but have provided the impetus and skill for the 700 credit unions now attached to parishes all over the United States.

World Extension Department

Solidly entrenched in the United States, CUNA recently undertook to provide help for others through a World Extension Department. On a modest budget this department sponsors field training and educational seminars for credit unionists from foreign lands. Experts from the World Extension Department have already mapped a credit union program for the South Pacific area. These same representatives actively cooperate with credit unionists in Europe through the World Health Organization, the United Nations and UNESCO.

Equally intent upon its task, the Cooperative League through its international division fosters knowledge and appreciation of cooperatives of all types throughout the world. The link among world-wide "cooperators" is tightening through the efforts of the League. Like the missionary who returned to Japan two centuries after Francis Xavier and found strong traces of his Christian mission, cooperators have met and talked with people from the communist satellite countries who are still fervent cooperators from pre-World War days. In a small way, the movement provides a common meeting ground for East and West.

Credit unions, through missionary efforts, now flourish in Jamaica, Trinidad and South America. In the Fiji and

¹ See John J. Morris, S.J., "Bishops, Priests and Credit Unions," *SOCIAL ORDER*, 7 (November, 1957), pp. 409-415.

Samoan Islands, credit unions form the backbone of the economy of hundreds of villages. The work of Father Marion Ganey, S.J. serves the rest of the credit union world as an example of impressive assistance to a primitive economy. In the Fiji Islands, Fr. Ganey is a missionary and a prophet. But he in turn is quick to pay tribute to the central organizers and proponents of credit unions here in the States; without them he could not have accomplished his work.

Father McLellan of Maryknoll boasts of a similar progress in Peru; recently his new league was affiliated to CUNA in Madison, Wisconsin, and now enjoys all the professional services and protections of this international organization. Missions in Nigeria, Basutoland, Tanganyika and Uganda will soon be strengthened by missionaries, clerical and lay, who have been trained in the credit union movement through the machinery of CUNA. When they return they will not be alone; continuous aid is available to them as conditions warrant. A recent news release reports that in the slums of Tokyo a group of rag pickers has started a credit union, with the help of a German missionary who wrote CUNA's World Extension Department for help. "It is a very small beginning," he wrote, explaining that it took a long time to convince the rag pickers that saving in the credit union was not giving money away. "The next thing they have to understand is that they have to use their money for economic progress. . . . It takes patience and three times patience in these surroundings."

Surely St. Pius X, who, as unofficial founder of one credit union in Italy, has been adopted informally as patron saint of the credit union movement,

smiles upon the work around the world. And with this in mind, small groups of credit unionists thank God each year at an annual Gold Mass on Laetare Sunday for the benefits brought to those most needing them through the credit union movement.



Through its international motto, "Not for profit, nor for charity but for service," the credit union movement states its aim—to provide economic support to low-income groups and thus provide them the bread and decent physical environment necessary even for normal spiritual living. To advance this cause further, credit union leaders are now sponsoring studies on aid to low-income groups all over the world. Through credit unions armed with a knowledge of their particular needs, help is being extended to Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans and Indians in our own country. This experience will, in turn, be passed on to all credit unionists everywhere.

Instrument of human advancement

Thus, credit unions, working on the principle that consumer credit is an inevitable need and that thrift is a virtue, foster their particular form of cooperatism for the education and advancement of the individual citizen so that he may more intelligently harness the economic forces of his surroundings and become the master—not the slave—of his own destiny.

THERE ARE very few Catholics of any intellectual sophistication who entertain the illusion that "we have all the answers." The tone which prevails in gatherings of Catholic scholars and students of affairs is quite the opposite. Those who are closely concerned with real and pressing problems are more inclined to ask whether we have any answers at all.

The question is not asked in full seriousness, of course. We know that Catholic social thought has the enormous advantage of beginning with a clear Christian image of man. We know too that our very old and rich tradition of dogmatic theology, morals, and social philosophy is relevant to even the most recent issues affecting man and society. Finally, we are well aware that the modern Church has not been idle. The Holy See, the national hierarchies, and a host of private Catholic thinkers have built up an imposing body of social thought addressed to the needs of our age.

Yet there remains a comparative lack of what, to borrow a phrase from a distinguished Jesuit confrere, we may call the "middle principles" of Catholic social thought. The basic insights of the Catholic view of life become fruitful only if they are translated into propositions which have practical application to a particular time and place. What, for example, are the specific demands of social justice in the United States in this and the coming decade? What institutions, what laws, what patterns of thought and action are needed to realize justice in the society in which we live? The fundamental principles, in terms of

Conflicts and

Politics

which answers to questions such as these must be formulated, have already been authoritatively stated. But the formulation of the answers lags behind.

Having said this, I should obviously turn my mind to working out a few answers. Instead, I shall do no more than pose some of the questions which face American Catholic social thought in one area of inquiry. These are what seem to me to be the most important questions concerning the *political* order in our country today.

Much of Catholic political theory has taken as its object an entity called "the state." A theory of the state is certainly necessary, and I do not mean to depreciate it. Nonetheless, "the state" is an abstraction. American Catholic political philosophy cannot pretend to completeness and actuality unless it includes in its object the state which exists and functions under the Constitution of the United States. Political thought, by its nature, must deal with political reality.

The American Constitution never has fitted Aristotle's definition of a constitution as a way of life aimed at realizing the highest ends of human nature. Our Constitution rather is a "frame of government." It defines the respective

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challenges in a pluralist society

and Catholicism

FRANCIS P. CANAVAN, S.J.

spheres of the state and national governments. It establishes the basic structure of the national government and confers upon it certain powers. It places limitations on the use of power by government, whether federal or state, chiefly by way of guaranteeing certain individual rights. Within these limits our constitutional system can accommodate itself to the attainment of a wide variety of social objectives and is compatible with many ways of life.

The Constitution does not of itself direct the nation toward any particular set of ultimate values. It could be used by Christians to create the temporal conditions of man's eternal salvation. But it could also be used by secularists to achieve their earth-bound conception of the good life. In practice it is used for the attainment of whatever social goals a sufficiently large cross-section of a pluralist society can agree upon.

This is the political reality with which Catholic thought, as all American social thought, must deal. It raises questions on two levels, theoretical and practical. That is to say, there is the question of accommodation of Catholic political philosophy to this kind of society, and there is a series of practical questions on the goals to be striven for

and the policies to be followed in this society, given that it is what it is.

The theoretical problem, in general terms, is that of working out a political philosophy which is both rooted in the Catholic tradition and suited to the conditions of contemporary American democracy. Much has already been done along this line by men of the highest intellectual caliber, but the problem is vast and complex and requires a great deal of added study. I shall try only to indicate in summary fashion what the problem is.

The premise of any Catholic political theory is that there is, in the phrase of Pius XII, an "absolute order of beings and purposes," which sets the ends and determines the limits of all human activity. This order constitutes a binding moral law, to which all social and political orders must conform. The intellectual problem for American Catholics is to relate this transcendent moral order to the constitutional order of the nation.

The problem is not to be solved simply by describing the natural law and saying that positive law must conform to it. The statement is true enough within its limits, but it ignores the nature of our society. In our society


there is no established or official consensus on the content or even on the existence of the natural law, still less on the authority of the Church to teach it. This disagreement is institutionalized, so to speak, in the great substantive rights of freedom of worship, speech, press, and assembly. These rights, although they are found in the First Amendment, are not mere appendages to the Constitution. They are constitutive principles of this kind of society and are meant to guarantee the equal freedom of all citizens under the law. How to relate the transcendent moral order to such a constitutional order is not an easy question to answer. But it is an important question because on its answer will depend, not whether Catholics can accept American democracy—obviously they do accept it—but on what terms.

Constitutional rights

Two particular aspects of the constitutional problem may be mentioned in order to illustrate the difficulties involved. One is the matter of our attitude toward constitutional rights. Constitutional rights are not the only principles of the American constitutional order. But they deserve special consideration, because the thinking of the general run of American Catholics in respect to them is frequently deficient. We too often fail to appreciate the terms in which a question of constitutional rights is posed and solved. When a communist or the publisher of an offensive novel pleads the First Amendment as a bar to his conviction, Catholics, along with many other Americans, tend to look upon the case as primarily, and indeed uniquely, a moral question. Does a person have a moral

right to plot a revolution or to publish a dirty book? Despite the expostulations of liberal extremists, the moral question is meaningful and relevant to the constitutional question. But it is not the issue that is raised in a constitutional case before the U. S. Supreme Court. The Court is concerned with the relation of an action to the law, and with the relation of the law to the Constitution. The decision of the court will determine those relations and not the conformity of an action with the Ten Commandments.

It therefore happens from time to time that the Court's decision differs from what would seem to be the dictate of moral law. In these instances the discrepancy may be due to nothing more than the difference in the questions which are asked and answered by moralists and by constitutional lawyers. The constitutional lawyer's answer can be criticized, of course, even if he be a learned justice of the Supreme Court. But a legal decision must be criticized in its own proper terms.



All of this is freely acknowledged by Catholic authorities in the fields of law and government. The idea of government limited in its powers and of individual rights protected by law has ancient Catholic roots and is fully in harmony with Catholic political philosophy. But there is a continuing need for the development and propagation of

a Catholic constitutionalism. We must produce a fully elaborated theory of rights which respects both the demands of moral law and the peculiar genius of the American constitutional system. We must also encourage among the Catholic people a deeper appreciation of the very large stake which we as Catholics have in effective guarantees of personal liberties in face of the expanding powers of the modern state.

A closely-related aspect of the constitutional problem is that of the proper relation between law and morals, and of the proper policy for Catholics to follow when controversies over public morality arise. It is worth noting that the areas of public policy which most strongly engage the attention of Catholics precisely as Catholics are those which touch directly or indirectly the institutions of marriage and the family. So too in the matter of public morality. The morals which Catholics want protected by law are sexual morals. In other areas of public morality, e.g. the control of drinking and gambling, Catholics tend to be considerably more liberal than the Protestant churches.

But the problem of law and sexual morals will become more and more acute, and it is safe to predict that in the next generation the sanctity of the human body and of life itself will become a sharply divisive public issue. American Catholics live in a society in which the Christian conception of human nature is fading from the minds of a large part of the people. The manifest disintegration of Christian standards of sexual morality is one result. This situation causes a reaction among the religiously and morally conservative, among whom Catholics are almost necessarily numbered, in the form of de-

mands that the traditional moral code be bolstered by law. Hence such controversial issues as public policy on divorce, contraception, and the censorship of publications. If present trends continue, euthanasia, compulsory sterilization and legalized abortion for psychological reasons will be argued on the political level within the next generation. A well-thought-out Catholic theory of the relation of civil law to public morals in our kind of society will become more necessary as time goes by.

School question

Another problem which causes Catholics and non-Catholics to line up on opposite sides is the famous "school question." It is agitated in all countries where Catholics are numerous, in many of them more violently than here. But the question is coming to the fore in this country because of a growing demand by Catholic spokesmen for some measure of public aid for parochial schools. Much thought has been and must continue to be given to the desirable kind and amount of such aid and to its compatibility with our state and federal constitutions. But the deepest source of opposition to Catholic demands for aid is the feeling that the public school has a uniquely privileged position because it is the temple of democracy and the ark of the American covenant. This raises the really basic question of the proper function of the state in education, the Catholic answer to which must be made acceptable to the population at large.

The remaining areas of public policy which could be mentioned are all arenas of intense controversy, but not of con-

flict between Catholics and non-Catholics as such. Yet the problems which arise in these areas are of crucial importance in our national life and therefore deserve our attention. I shall allude only to those which concern our domestic economy and our foreign relations.

Within one lifetime, the role of government in the national economy has been dramatically magnified. This vast expansion of the functions of government is not simply the result of the machinations of New Dealers and/or creeping socialists. On the other hand the process need not be accepted as by definition progress, which only reactionaries would resist. A critical attitude is both possible and desirable.

Let us indicate briefly the scale of governmental intervention in the economy today. Agricultural production is controlled, though not very effectively, and is subsidized at a cost to the taxpayer of between five and six billion dollars, according to the current budget. A wide range of businesses is more or less closely regulated by a dozen major federal regulatory commissions and a host of other agencies on the national and state levels. Government ownership is not a major factor in the American economy, but the federal government is directly engaged in about a hundred lines of business, some of them quite important. The labor union movement owes its present success to favorable federal laws but, after the recent legislation, is now subject to rather hostile supervision. The country's financial structure is regulated, in a somewhat decentralized fashion, by the Federal Reserve System and the government is generally held responsible for controlling the expansion

and contraction of credit. Social security programs such as old-age insurance and unemployment compensation indicate a degree of governmental responsibility for the material welfare of every wage-earner. Finally, government spending is not only enormously large; it has become the chief prop of our whole structure of prices and wages.

To summarize in the words of Samuel Lubell:

The expansion of government to its present scale has politicalized virtually all economic life. The wages being paid most workers today are political wages, reflecting political pressures rather than anything that might be considered the normal workings of supply and demand. The prices farmers receive are political prices. The profits business is earning are political profits. The savings people hold have become political savings, since their real value is subject to abrupt depreciation by political decisions.¹

Developments such as these raise fundamental questions to which answers in terms of Catholic social philosophy are desirable. To quote Lubell again, the "conflict over the proper limits of government has intensified steadily until it has become the sharpest single political divider in the country."² It would be disingenuous to pretend that this struggle can be resolved by a statement of the correct theoretical answer. But on the other hand, it would be cynical to leave the resolution of the struggle to the play of contending political forces, and that is where it will be left unless answers based on sound principles are furnished.

Two contributions which Catholic thought is peculiarly qualified to make suggest themselves. One is an elabora-

¹ *The Future of American Politics*. Harper, New York, 1952, p. 259.

² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

tion of the principle of subsidiarity into a series of more detailed principles applicable to the situations which actually exist in the United States today. For example, the Catholic student of the labor movement would develop a theory of union self-regulation which would effectively safeguard both the union's independence and the public interest. Or again, in the near future we shall surely be called upon to take sides on proposals for compulsory health insurance. It would be well to have thought in advance of the meaning of subsidiarity in this context.

Another service may be rendered by clarifying and criticizing the goals of our various public social policies. The Catholic contribution here would be at least twofold. First, the positive side of the Catholic concern for the family as the basic unit of society would show itself in the orientation of social-welfare programs toward the family rather than toward the individual as such. Secondly, Catholic internationalism would direct our economic policies away from merely national to more generally human concerns. For instance, our agricultural policy since the New Deal has been to restrict production in order to raise prices. The question has been asked, and should continue to be asked, not only whether such a policy makes economic and political sense, but whether in a hunger-stricken world it is even moral.

This leads to a consideration of the problems of our country in relation to the international order. These are so many and so complex that it will not be possible even to mention them all, but a few may be stated briefly. To take the *ultima ratio* first, Catholic moral theology is faced with the urgent task

of clarifying the morality of modern warfare. The legal theory of the sovereign nation-state would also seem to need rethinking in the face of recent international developments. Catholic thought might also devote itself to the role of the virtue of charity in relations among nations, and specifically to a theory of economic aid on its own merits and as a permanent thing, independent of the exigencies of the Cold War.

Other problems must go unmentioned because of the limitations both of space and of my knowledge. I should like to say in conclusion that where I have urged the necessity of Catholic thinking about political problems I am not unaware that much of it has already been done, and done very well. My aim has been to spotlight the problems that need continued effort and thought.

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“WE’RE DOWN,” said a prominent labor leader last September 14, when told that President Eisenhower had signed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it law. “We’re down,” he repeated, and then added hopefully, “but don’t count us out.” His sentiments were shared by Union officers throughout the United States. They were very far down. The passage of the law was an unexpected and complete political defeat. That legislation so vigorously opposed by labor could come out of a Congress whose Democratic majorities had been increased a year ago by victories of labor-supported candidates surprised both labor leaders and usually well-informed observers.

In retrospect it is clear that the outcome was determined in the House of Representatives by the crucial vote on the Landrum-Griffin Bill, the prototype of the legislation finally adopted. That vote was 229 to 201. In April a labor poll of the House of Representatives had forecast majority support for the milder Kennedy-Ervin Bill of the Senate. In August when 15 altered votes would have meant a labor victory, they could not be found. The final votes—95 to 2 in the Senate, 352 to 52 in the House of Representatives—left labor leaders shaking their heads in hurt bewilderment.

This unexpected collapse of political influence accounts in part, but only in part, for the bitterness with which unions greeted the new legislation. For this new law only adds to the depth of what must seem to labor leaders to be a veritable flood of woes.

The National Director of the Institute of Social Order supplied these reflections at the request of l’Action Populaire, French Catholic social research center.

Congress deserves criticism

New

For 20 years prior to 1953 the American labor movement grew uninterruptedly in power and prestige; it increased from less than three million to 17 million members, from less than six to almost 27 per cent of the labor force. In addition to annual wage increases, unions had widened the area of collective bargaining and improved the non-wage terms of their agreements. For six years, however, the labor movement has been beset by problems from within and from without and these are growing in number and dimension.

The growth in membership is almost imperceptible and has scarcely kept pace with the increase in the labor force.¹ Since the end of World War II labor unions have shown little success in opening new frontiers, geographical or industrial; the South, the mountain states, the white-collar and service workers, and small plants remain largely unorganized. The ominous threat which looms on the horizon, however, is erosion of union strength in areas which have long been unionized. In 1950 the groups from which unions drew the bulk of their membership—craftsmen, semi-skilled production workers, and

¹ One important exception should be noted. The Teamsters, despite unfavorable publicity and expulsion from AFL-CIO, are growing rapidly.

less for the law it wrote than for the law it failed to write.

Labor Law

LEO C. BROWN, S.J.

industrial laborers—made up 41.7 per cent of the labor force. Today they constitute about 36.7 per cent of that force. During the same years the so-called white-collar workers—professional, technical, clerical, and sales workers, managers, officials and proprietors—have increased from 36.6 to 42 per cent of the labor force. One statistic sharply illustrates this trend: In 1950 there were about 12 million semi-skilled production workers; today, despite an increase of 14 per cent in the labor force, there are about 12.2 million. In 1950 there were about 21 million white-collar workers; today these workers

number just short of 28 million, an increase of 33 per cent.

With economic improvement some relative increase in employment among professional, distributional and service workers was foreseeable; such shifts are a by-product of a higher standard of living. What was not foreseen, and what constitutes the more serious threat to union strength, is the rapid decline in the ratio of production workers to non-production workers in the durable-goods manufacturing industries from which large industrial unions draw their membership. The following table illustrates this trend:

Ratio of Production to Non-Production Workers in
Selected Industries in 1947 and 1957

| Industry | Ratio of Production to Non-Production Workers | |
|--------------------------------|--|------|
| | 1947 | 1957 |
| Fabricated Metals | 5.3 | 3.7 |
| Transportation Equipment | 4.6 | 2.8 |
| Machinery | 3.6 | 2.6 |
| Electrical Machinery | 3.3 | 2.3 |
| Instruments | 3.6 | 2.0 |
| Petroleum | 3.5 | 2.1 |
| Chemical | 3.1 | 2.0 |
| Ordinance | 5.8 | 1.5 |

Source: Based on data in *Fortune*, April, 1958, which relied principally on studies made by Murray Wernick of the Federal Reserve Board and the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

In other industries this shift has been even more marked. In one major aircraft company, North American Aviation Company, the United Automobile Workers have organized almost the entire production and maintenance force; even so, the union represents only one-half of all employees.

These changes in the structure of the labor force have created complex problems for unions, problems of a magnitude which few of them seem to realize. If the present rate of growth of the professional and technical group continues for another decade in the durable-goods industries, the groups from which many unions have traditionally drawn their membership may be a minority of the work force. Unless unions succeed in attracting the white-collar workers, the base of union power in these industries will have suffered substantial erosion.

Difficulty of organizing white collar

The problems of mass-production unions in organizing professional and technical workers are formidable. A union whose strength has resided in semi-skilled production workers offers little appeal to the professional and technical worker. There is a gap in educational background and income levels. There is a vast difference in psychology. Even the success of unions in achieving goals which appeal to production workers, such as advancement only through seniority, make them unattractive to a professional group, who want the fullest opportunity to advance through merit. The attempt of the United Automobile Workers to woo technicians and professional people by allowing them to form quasi-autonomous units for voting on contractual issues which affect them has not been notably successful.

Moreover, automation has increased organizing problems of unions in other

ways. As new techniques make old establishments obsolete, management is decentralizing production toward smaller plants. A few years ago the United Automobile Workers had more than 24 local unions of more than 10,000 members. Today it has about 14 unions of that size. In the chemical industry 80 per cent of the establishments have a labor force of 100 or less. As establishments become smaller and more separated both the difficulty and the costs of organizing them mount rapidly.

The decision of AFL-CIO in 1958 to lay off one-third of its organizing staff may have deep significance. The ostensible reason for this bold action was the loss of revenue consequent upon expulsion of the Teamsters, Bakers, and Laundry Workers, which comprised about one-eighth of the Federation's membership. It is difficult, however, to accept this as the complete reason. The Federation which still numbered 14 million members could surely have found the financial means of keeping its organizing staff intact, had the prospects of notably increasing its membership been favorable.

The apparent failure of most unions to assess properly the significance of the changes which are occurring in the industrial structure traces in part to other, and from the union's point of view, more vexing problems. The revelations of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (first headed by Senator Ives of New York, later by Senator Douglas of Illinois) and of the Senate's Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor-Management Field (the McClellan Committee), serious as they were,

adduced proof of widespread corruption in but a minority of unions.² Nevertheless, all unions suffered serious loss of public prestige; moreover, AFL-CIO was forced to assume a degree of authority over subordinate bodies which undermined the principle of autonomy which had long been a basic and necessary organizing principle of the American Federation of Labor, and to a lesser extent of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. At the same time jurisdictional problems between industrial unions formerly associated with CIO and some of the more influential unions of the AFL, which the merger was designed to heal, reappeared in forms so serious that they challenged even the extraordinary abilities of George Meany, the President of AFL-CIO. So great, at times, has been the dissatisfaction of influential AFL groups that only the grave external problems confronting the labor movement prevented their withdrawal from the Federation.

Labor's most serious problem, however, has yet to be mentioned. It is the progressive deterioration of relations between labor and management. Arthur J. Goldberg, special counsel for the AFL-CIO, in an address last year at the University of Wisconsin, named this deterioration, which he described as a hardening of attitudes, as the most serious problem confronting labor organizations.

After some 20 years of responsible collective bargaining in the major industries, we reasonably might have expected a measure of . . . understanding and good will, of ability to see the problems of the other side, of mutuality of efforts to reach solutions satisfactory to both. . . . Yet that result has not come about. . . .

² See Leo C. Brown, "Labor Racketeering," *SOCIAL ORDER*, 9 (September, 1959), pp. 320-350.

In recent past I see a hardening of attitudes and retrogression rather than progress in understanding. Management is tougher, unions are tougher, and the end product is not necessarily good for either side. . . . Throughout the American industry there is a widespread movement to replace genuine acceptance of and co-operation with unions by a philosophy of labor-management relations keyed to keeping the unions at arm's length, of working with the union as little as possible, of seeking, whenever possible, to go around the union and its membership rather than to deal with unions as a living institution.

The Labor Day letter of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Social Welfare Conference made similar observations. Mr. Boyd Leedom, chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, described himself as heartsick over the hardening of attitudes which he finds in both camps.

Whatever truth there may be in these observations, there can no longer be any doubt that management in many industries is reassessing its bargaining relationships and is offering more determined and more cohesive resistance to union demands. The resistance first began to appear in the protracted negotiations in the automobile industry which Reuther described as the toughest in his 20 years as a labor leader. It became clearer in the protracted rubber strike, the longest in the history of the industry, in the strikes of the farm-equipment manufacturers and glass companies, in the mutual-aid pact made last year by six major airlines.³ It has become obvious in the four-months old

³ By the terms of this pact, made on November 2, 1958, a signatory shut down by a strike would be paid the increase in revenues of the other companies flying routes of the signatory during the strike. The pact covers strikes for wage demands in excess of recommendations of a presidential emergency board or before exhaustion of procedures under the Railway Labor Act.

steel strike, which spread unemployment throughout industry. Here the major issue is management's demand for authority to revise work loads. This issue, if viewed as a practical problem by parties determined to find a mutually-satisfactory solution, could be resolved within a few hours. There are many acceptable methods, ranging from negotiation to arbitration, for deciding whether a particular job is over-manned. But the issue is not being debated as a practical problem; it has been elevated into a controversy over principles and mutual rights. The question of who has the right to decide how hard men shall work goes to the root of collective-bargaining relationships. As a result, we are now witnessing a veritable war of attrition.

These are the problems with which the unions (whose public relations, whose approach to organizing and collective bargaining have remained essentially unchanged for 30 years) are ill-equipped to cope. This is the background against which the new labor law and the unions' reaction to it must be considered.

New law a synthesis

The new law defies easy summary. Indeed, any summary risks being tedious for the general reader but for the sake of completeness some of the main provisions of the new law must be set down. As finally adopted, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 is a synthesis of several bills and motions introduced at various stages of the deliberations in the Senate and House of Representatives. It treats matters as diverse as the rights of union members and the jurisdiction of state and federal agencies in labor matters. In some places it is detailed, technical

and involved. The Act has seven titles, each of which is introduced by a heading broadly descriptive of the matters covered therein.

Title I, "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations":⁴

1. Establishes, subject to reasonable rules, the equal rights of all members of labor organizations to nominate candidates for union office, to vote in elections and referendums, to participate in the deliberations of, and vote on, the business of the union meetings.

2. Prohibits an increase of union dues or the levying of assessments, except, in the case of local unions, after majority approval by secret ballot at a membership meeting or referendum, and in the case of other bodies (the Federation excepted) after approval by majority vote of delegates or membership referendum.

3. Protects the rights of union members to institute actions in courts or before administrative agencies irrespective of whether the union or its officers are named as defendants.

4. Prohibits fining, expelling, or otherwise disciplining a member unless he has been served with written specific charges, given a reasonable time to prepare a defense, and afforded a full and fair hearing.

5. Provides for enforcement of these rights by suit in federal courts. Infringement of rights accompanied by force or violence or a threat thereof, is made a criminal act punishable by fine or imprisonment. (Section 610)

Title II, "Reporting":

1. Requires unions to adopt a constitution and by-laws and to file copies of the same with the Secretary of Labor.

⁴ This summary, in the interest of brevity, makes no attempt at completeness. It attempts only to convey an idea of the scope of the Act.

2. Requires unions to file a report with the Secretary of Labor which, among other things, identifies officers, states the union's qualifications for membership, its regular dues and fees, its provisions for dispensing funds, auditing finances, calling meetings, selecting officers, disciplining members, ratifying contracts and authorizing strikes.

3. Requires unions to file with the Secretary of Labor an annual report disclosing financial conditions and operations for the preceding fiscal year, and to make the same information available to members. Members have a right, enforceable by suit, to examine, for just cause, books and records to verify the reports.

4. Requires union officers and employees (excepting exclusively clerical or custodial employees) to file an annual report with the Secretary of Labor on certain forms of business income and business transactions; the obvious purpose of this requirement is to force disclosure of any business interest which might conflict with the individual's responsibility as union officer or employee.

5. Requires reports from employers and labor-relations consultants which would disclose illicit payments to unions or labor officials and other payments made for the purpose of interfering with employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by this or other federal labor acts.

6. Makes the willful violation of the reporting requirements subject to fine not in excess of \$10,000, imprisonment for one year, or both.

Title III, "Trusteeships":

1. Requires every labor organization which assumes trusteeship of a subordinate organization to file a report twice a year.

2. Sets out the purposes for which such a trusteeship may be established, which include correction of corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of the collective-bargaining agreements, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objectives of labor organizations.

3. Declares illegal certain actions relating to labor organizations under trusteeship. These include: Counting the votes of delegates from the organization under trusteeship in any convention or election of officers, unless these delegates were chosen by a secret ballot of the members of the subordinate body; the transfer to the labor organization of funds belonging to the subordinate body, except the normal per capita tax and assessments.

Title IV, "Elections":

1. Requires election of international union officials every five years, of officers of intermediate bodies every four years, and local officers every three years.

2. Establishes detailed rules designed to assure fair contests and honest elections.

3. Establishes an enforcement procedure which empowers the Secretary of Labor, after complaint and investigation, to institute an action in a federal court to set the election aside, to direct a new election, or to direct a hearing and vote on the removal of officers.

Title V, "Safeguards":

1. Declares that union officers occupying positions of trust in relation to the union and its members, have the duty of administering union monies and properties solely for the benefit of the union and its members, and of refraining from holding or acquiring any personal in-

terest which conflicts with the interests of the organization.

2. Provides that when violation of these duties occurs and the labor organization or its higher officers fail to take appropriate action, after being requested to do so by a member, such member may sue to recover damages, secure accounting, or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization.

3. Makes embezzlement of union funds a crime punishable by a fine not to exceed \$10,000, imprisonment not to exceed five years, or both.

4. Requires all union officers and agents who handle union funds or trust funds to be bonded in an amount not less than 10 per cent of the funds handled by the officer or his predecessor during the preceding fiscal year, but not in excess of \$500,000.

5. Limits loans to union officers and employees to a total indebtedness of \$2,500.

6. Provides that no union or employer may pay the fine of any officer or employee convicted of violation of the Act.

7. Makes it illegal for a communist or person convicted for any one of 14 named felonies to serve as a union officer or labor-relations consultant for five years after termination of membership in the party or after conviction or the end of imprisonment, unless prior to the end of the five-year period citizenship rights have been restored.

8. Amends section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act by broadening its scope. This provision made it illegal for an employer to deliver to a representative of his employees (or for a representative of such employees to receive) money or other things of value.

Title VI, "Miscellaneous," among other matters:

1. Gives the Secretary of Labor broad investigatory powers with respect to probable violations of certain sections of the Act, and in connection therewith the right to inspect pertinent records, to subpoena witnesses, and require the production of documents.

2. Forbids picketing for the purpose of personal profit or enrichment of an individual, except for a *bona fide* increase in wages or employee benefits.

Title VII, "Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act," contains several amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act of which it will suffice for our purpose to mention two:

1. "Hot-goods" clauses are prescribed. Except in some phases of the construction industry and the garment industry, the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union and an employer to agree to cease handling the goods or products of another employer or to cease doing business with any person. All such agreements are void.

2. Organization picketing is severely restricted. The Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to engage in picketing to force an employer to recognize it as the bargaining agent of his employees, or to force the employees to accept it as their bargaining agent unless it is the certified representative: (a) Where the employer has lawfully recognized another labor union and a question concerning certification may not appropriately be raised; (b) where within the preceding 12 months a valid election for selecting a representative has been conducted; (c) where picketing has been engaged in for 30 days and no petition (which would lead to an investigation by the National Labor Relations Board and possibly to an order for an election) has been filed.

Law must be tested

Is this law moderate but effective, neither punitive nor extreme, as Representatives Landrum and Griffin termed their bill? Or is it simply, as labor sees it, a "union-busting" law? These questions cannot be answered at the present time. The law while specific is also general, while detailed is also vague; it is complex, difficult and untried. Long experience and years of clarifying decisions by enforcing agencies and the courts must precede any confident judgment of its effect.

Certainly many provisions of the law on first reading offer little evidence of "union-busting" intent. The bill-of-rights, election provisions, regulation of trusteeships and fiduciary responsibilities imposed upon union officers appear to set standards no more severe than those already observed in many unions. Fault cannot be found with the prohibition of extortionate picketing and most people will approve the outlawing of "hot-cargo" agreements.

Yet other provisions can scarcely be termed moderate. The reporting requirements which extend to all unions, large and small, unions with clerical and accounting staffs as well as to unions with unpaid, part-time officers, show little appreciation of the problem of the small union. The bonding requirement appears to place needlessly heavy burdens on small and hard-pressed locals. It is usually in such locals that any interested member can obtain adequate knowledge of union finances, where the surplus of income over expenses offers little temptation, where the rare defalcation can scarcely constitute an evil requiring the scrutiny of a federal agency and where the new bonding standards may impose a disproportionate financial burden. The requirement that all unions, irrespective

of size, adopt a constitution and by-laws may substitute an artificial legalism for informality in conducting union meetings and transacting union business with no real gain in democracy or effectiveness. There is a genuine possibility that the law may impose the heaviest burdens on unions which least need regulation.

Organizational picketing restricted

The restrictions on organizational picketing are perhaps the most controversial provisions of the law. Organizational picketing is almost as old as the American labor movement. By such picketing a union attempts to induce a nonunion employer to recognize it, or nonunion employees to accept it, as the collective-bargaining agency. This kind of picketing is an abuse where the employees are already represented by legally-recognized unions. In such instances the picketing seeks to compel the employer to violate the law and to deprive employees of legally-guaranteed rights. But the desirability of severely restricting picketing of all nonunion establishments is not equally clear. In the service industries in urban centers, for example, the standard which a union can achieve in its organized shops is conditioned by the standards which prevail in nonunion establishments. The Supreme Court of the United States also recognized that, "The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace."⁵

It will be readily conceded that employees should decide whether or not they wish to be unionized. But what really is in question is not the right of the employees to make such a decision but which group of employees may ex-

⁵ *American Federation of Labor v. Swing* (312 U. S. 321, 326).

ercise such democratic rights. Is it those of the individual establishment. Or is it the working community throughout the area in which competition is effective?



Long ago the Supreme Court observed:

[For union organization to be] at all effective, employees must make their combination extend beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in the same community united, because, in the competition between employers, they are bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership, and especially among those whose labor at lower wages will injure their whole guild.⁶

The present law, of course, does not forbid all organizational picketing. It is legal unless it has the effect of inducing *any* person employed by a third party, not to deliver goods or perform work. Thus the legality of the union's action is made dependent upon the acts of third parties over whom it may have no control.

As late as June 17, 1958, Senator Johnson stated: "I think it is safe to say that Congress must in the future approach the questions of . . . organizational picketing. . . . At the present time, we probably do not have enough information to settle them to the satisfaction of anyone." Congress now has settled these questions. Only time will show whether this settlement has given adequate consideration to the needs of working people and of employer in

unionized establishments,⁷ especially in the service trades.

To continue observations in this vein may appear to be piling straw on straw. But the fact is that union officials, as they come to understand better the requirements of the law, are gravely concerned. Most disquieting, of course, are the criminal provisions of the law. The law punishes only for willful violations, but its detail and its obscurity offer occasions for material violations through mere inadvertence. What labor officials are asking is whether, in the atmosphere created by years of unfavorable publicity of the corruption in some unions, investigating agencies and juries will be prepared to accept a defense of inadvertence, no matter how justified it may be. The outlook of union people is darkened by their multiple problems both internal and external, by the dismal failure of their efforts, first to block and then to modify, the reform legislation, and by a widespread conviction among them that they must expect the severest interpretation which regulating agencies and courts can place upon the law.

Future depends on federal courts

This writer, however, is inclined to adopt a much less pessimistic outlook. The law, it must be conceded, is definitely restrictive and needlessly burdensome. It will not destroy labor unions and it is doubtful that it will seriously hamper them in the achievement of legitimate goals. Less than a year ago a large sample of the voting public dem-

⁶ *American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council* (257 US 184,209).

⁷ It is not generally recognized that an employer who has been unionized may compete unequally with nonunion establishments. Often greater pressure for extending a union to nonunion establishments comes from union employers than from members.

onstrated no anti-labor bias in rejecting right-to-work legislation in five out of the six states in which the issue appeared on the ballot. Can we expect this public to tolerate the destruction of unions? While the federal courts, upon whose decisions the interpretation of the new legislation will ultimately depend, have shown an increasing appreciation of the changed status and present power of labor unions, they have likewise demonstrated a perceptive sympathy for the needs and problems of collective bargaining.

Regulating agency preferable

Congress deserves criticism less for the law it wrote than for the law it failed to write. Had less reliance been placed on the courts for enforcement and more upon a regulating agency, had the law given unions the choice: 1. of adopting their own codes of ethics and enforcement tribunals (which could have been required to meet minimum standards set up by the enforcing agency) or 2. of being subjected to regulation by the agency, the objectives of the legislation might have been achieved both more simply and more effectively and at a much smaller cost to the unions and to the government, and, not less important, the fullest measure of genuine democracy would have been preserved and promoted. With such a law we might have seen a multiplication of impartial appeals boards, such

as that adopted a few years ago by the Upholsterers' Union, which seem to have been an effective guarantee against discriminatory treatment of members and subordinate bodies with the minimum of interference in the internal procedures of the union and at the most modest of financial outlays.⁸ Such legislation, too, would have strengthened the hands of honest elements within the union and enabled them to achieve reform while preserving a maximum of informality and simplicity needed in the conduct of workingmen's associations. Such an experiment might have required the temporary toleration of some abuses of lesser moment. But the preservation of the fullest measure of self rule, and the diversity and flexibility which it permits, is worth some costs. The effort should have been made. The results might well have been sounder than this legislation will achieve.

⁸ The Upholsterers' International Union in 1953 amended its constitution to create an appeals board composed wholly "of impartial persons of good repute not having membership or any other direct interest in the Upholsterers' International Union or its affairs." Members disciplined by a local or the international, after appealing to the union's executive board, may address a further appeal to the appeals board or to the union's annual convention. The decision of this impartial appeals board is binding upon the union, not however upon the disciplined member. If the appeals board should sustain the original verdict, the member may address a further appeal to the annual convention. This board, composed chiefly of university professors of law and economics who are knowledgeable in labor matters, and which originally included at least one federal judge, has been required to hear only one appeal since its creation. Obviously the scope of such boards could be widened. Cf *Social Order*, 3 (December, 1953), p. 460; 4 (January, 1954), p. 130.



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Books

WORLD LAW, POLITICS, and PEACE

Stefan Possony •

The reviewer is Professor of International Politics at Georgetown and Visiting Professor at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the University of Pennsylvania.

THE AUTHOR OF THIS NEW TREATISE on international law,¹ presently professor at Saint Louis University, is Austria's last pre-*Anschluss* Chancellor (1934-1938). As leader of a small European state which fell before Nazi aggression and as tormented victim of seven years of Nazi prisons and concentration camps, this distinguished Catholic statesman is an eloquent witness for the extraordinary human importance of international law. Dr. von Schuschnigg's life proves that non-observance of the law of nations, especially by the great powers, endangers world peace, hampers the progress of civilization, and produces countless tragedies. Dr. von Schuschnigg does not talk about his personal stakes in the drama of international order. He relies, dispassionately, on his eminent qualifications as a lawyer. As a former Minister of Justice in the Republic of Austria, he has handled many cases of international law. He also has been a thorough student of the various European schools of international law and, during his stay in the United States, has familiarized himself completely with American and British thinking and practices.

Dr. von Schuschnigg's book should be recommended to students of international law and international relations, especially at Catholic universities. It offers many advantages which cannot easily be duplicated by other works on the subject. It is clearly and concisely written and it almost achieves the impossible, namely a well-nigh complete coverage of the entire topic within relatively limited space. The argument is simple to follow. The author can be relied upon to give all sides to a dispute and to indicate the different interpretations which may derive from various aprioristic theories. The greatest merit of this book is that Dr. von Schuschnigg writes as a true and tested scholar as well as a convinced idealist, and not as an adept of *Realpolitik*. At the same time, his political experience and his personal familiarity with practicalities provide the reader with a sense of reality and make him appreciate the "contradictions" between legal theories and the requirements of power and survival. This is not international law addressed from one ivory tower to the other.

Students of international relations and modern history also will consult Dr. von Schuschnigg's work with great profit, since it covers many of the critical events of the first part of the twentieth century.

¹ Kurt von Schuschnigg, *INTERNATIONAL LAW, An Introduction to the Law of Peace*, Milwaukee, Bruce, 512 pp. \$6.95.

While I am vastly impressed by Dr. von Schuschnigg's performance in analyzing the legal problems of the Western world, I propose to expatiate on the points where I differ with the distinguished author. Thus I must be critical of the treatment he gives communism. He fails, for example, to discuss the problem of the recognition of communist China, although as a matter of course, he discusses the traditional doctrines of recognition and non-recognition. Obviously, the Chinese problem is *sui generis*, for many reasons. In one passage he says that "Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia accepted the Machiavelian interpretation of law as an order to serve national interests." This is only a partial truth: the Soviet system, to be sure, is a reincarnation of Russian imperialism but *in addition* it is the main element of a world revolutionary movement. It has customarily interpreted its legal obligations and opportunities to suit its revolutionary purposes. This revolutionary movement, of which the Soviet states are merely instruments, is, in essence, supranational and international. The communists define international law as a "complex of rules which regulate the relations among states"; these rules allegedly reflect the interests of the "respective classes" ruling the states. In the Soviet scheme of things, however, the state is subordinated to the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is to the Communist Party, which is considered as the true and legitimate sovereign.

In another passage, the author points out that the Soviets disregard the principle of self-determination which they are upholding in their propaganda. He refers the reader to the example of the Baltic states, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary which

have been deprived of their right of self-determination by unilateral Soviet action. This is of course true but it should have been mentioned that the various nations *within* the Soviet Union which, according to the Soviet constitution, have the right to secede, such as the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, *etc.*, also have been deprived of this right. Originally the Soviets promised that self-determination could be freely exercised but for more than 40 years they never have lived up to the obligation they pretended to have assumed. At this time many non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union do not enjoy the protection which, according to international law, should be accorded to minorities. It might have been useful if Dr. von Schuschnigg had discussed the legal structure of the Soviet Union because this so-called federation is based on treaties and constitutions of *international* legal character. The many cases of European minority rights and their violations, which the author discusses, are significant as precedents. But the many violations of minority rights which have occurred within the Soviet Union are of greater importance because they have affected, and still are affecting, large nations and because those cases have not yet been noticed too carefully by international lawyers.

I disagree with the author about what he calls his "optimistic outlook". This optimism stems from the rediscovery by many exponents of international law that law and ethics as well as norms and principles are interconnected. Dr. von Schuschnigg is hopeful also because "not only the scope of international law is wider than ever before but also [because] probably the number of established rules that are observed, on the ground of mutual benefit, if not for

other reasons, is larger than the number of rules that are broken." He believes "it is evident that the law between nations (*jus inter gentes*) is clearly on its way to become the law of humanity (*jus humanitatis*)."

The reason why I cannot share this view is best explained by a few sentences which Dr. von Schuschnigg, himself, devotes to conquest:

Forceful annexation [conquest] no longer gives legal title to territorial acquisition. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War [Kellogg-Briand Pact], the U. N. Charter, and Pan-American agreements invalidate taking possession of territory by military force in violation of international obligations. But, if the community of nations should, explicitly or silently, pardon or tolerate unlawful conquest, undisturbed continuous possession for some length of time may create the title of prescription, defined "as the acquisition of territory by an adverse holding continued through a long term of years."

In modern times the ability of victorious states to hang on to their conquests is enhanced to a point where "continuous possession" may not be "disturbed" for several generations. How then can international law become more effective? If duration of unlawful possession more or less legitimizes conquest and if it becomes increasingly difficult to dislodge the invader, I would assume that the rule of law is being weakened and natural law, or justice, is regressing. For that matter, this theory implies that to prevent the legalization of conquest, war must be waged in order to disturb "continuous possession." Thus, war would be the sanction of international law—but it is argued that, to the contrary, the observance of international law would preserve peace. I am perturbed that Dr. von Schusch-

nigg did not recognize the ancient concept of the "just war" which, incidentally, was reasserted by Khrushchev in his speech of September 30, 1959 at Peking.

Another point. It is true that in the air age all men have become "virtual neighbors." But they do not share, as the author asserts, the same interests. Nor is it true that world society "once referred to only in political fiction," has become "a reality." There may be emerging a number of "regional societies" but the world is cleaved more than ever because the increased proximity of power centers is coupled to a radical divergence of political philosophy, public morality, and ultimate objectives. Dr. von Schuschnigg is right in saying that a world society cannot exist unless based on an international legal order whose effectiveness "is in no small measure determined by the acceptance of common standards of civilization." The community of standards cannot be decreed by international agreement, "but must be anchored in public opinion trained to prefer the rational to the emotional, prepared to treat other people irrespective of their nationality and race in the same way as they themselves expect and desire to be treated." No such public opinion exists at present. If it existed, it would not necessarily last, nor could it be effective within the dictatorial states which rule 40 per cent of humanity. The Charter of the United Nations does signify a "rediscovery of universal international law" but the "near universality of our contemporary international organization" is fictional. Consequently, I cannot subscribe to Dr. von Schuschnigg's statement that "the last decade shows the greatest progress ever made in the history of international

law," if he wants to say that real and substantial progress has been made.

At this juncture the crucial problem of international law (as well as the crucial problem of world peace) still is that international law is not binding on those who consider the attainment of their objectives as the overriding criterion. The aggressor may take international law seriously, if he can use it as a means to his ends but otherwise he considers it as just that many "scraps of paper." The enormous growth of communist military power does not herald the dawning of a "just" world society. It heralds "protracted conflict," to speak in the language of Mao Tse-tung. I can find no solace in the fact—if it is a fact—that the "principles for preserving peace are now formulated and acknowledged—at least by word—by the nations of the world." Soviet principles and our principles are not identical, even if the words were the same (which they are not).

Dr. von Schuschnigg does acknowledge that international law is not an instrument through which world peace can be preserved. This does not detract from the value of international law which has many positive uses, especially

among nations of similar outlook and even among nations which are fundamentally hostile to each other but who occasionally may find it preferable to negotiate than to fight. The greatest damage which is customarily done to the standing of international law is that its practical political significance is being overadvertised. International law is not a panacea and it does not ensure that justice may not have to be secured by force of arms.

With this criticism out of the way, I want to congratulate the distinguished author on his outstanding achievement and to thank him for the many stimulating hours which I spent with his book. I am sure that many of my colleagues and numerous students will gain much instruction from his convincing and able exposition. As a former Austrian, I am proud to consider Kurt von Schuschnigg my mentor and teacher. I am doubly proud of the intellectual accomplishment of a great European statesman, now an American citizen, whose heroic fight for world peace and for the self-determination of nations was not always clearly understood by our present American compatriots.

REAL POWER vs. PAPER PROPERTY.

Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J.

THE FIVE CHAPTERS of this little book¹ are the Stafford Little Lectures delivered at Princeton

Author of The Functional Economy, Father Dempsey is Professor of Economics at Marquette University, Milwaukee.

University early in 1958. The four prefaces constituting more than ten per cent of the book are the reflection of the author's view of the reactions of four segments of our society—business men, "liberals," scholars and the uncommitted public. The subject, the

¹ **POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A New Development in American Political Economy.** By Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Harcourt Brace, New York. viii and 184 pp. \$3.75.

author and the style forecast a wide circulation.

The lectures are concerned with the interpretation of three sets of inter-related facts. The first set of facts is the existence of enormous aggregates of physical capital: less than 600 corporations are stated to control two-thirds of American production. These aggregates are so large that it is impossible that they be really "possessed" by anybody and they are judged to be on the whole extremely efficient. The second set of facts is the same to which Mr. Berle forcibly called attention 20 years ago; in the present structure of American business, ownership and management no longer coincide. But this fact acquires a new significance because of a third new set of facts. Through the development of funds, pension and mutual chiefly, in addition to the familiar insurance companies, large aggregates of money capital are now also in the hands of professional managers; this part of his material is based on the "study of pension trusts by Dr. Paul Harbrecht, S.J. which will shortly be brought out by the Twentieth Century Fund." This "chain reaction of capital formation and aggregation of economic power" is the topic of the lectures which are devoted in approximately equal part to symptoms, diagnosis and prescription.

Since the reforms of the New Deal, with which the author frankly identifies himself, these facts have caused no serious trouble; they have been held in line by a public consensus or community consensus which has established "minimum standards of capacity and acceptability for the holders of such power." Public consensus has up to now

rather efficiently prevented serious abuse. But to assure this for the future, it is necessary that the "Lord's Spiritual" of the social order (the universities, the journalist philosophers like Lippmann, and any similar agency of honest, independent and intelligent opinion such as the I.S.O., and perhaps some of the foundations) be given a more secure and explicit role in the community in order that the public consensus be genuinely well-grounded and currently informed. Clear lines of what the public consensus will approve are wanting "but as a generality, there is a clear and recognizable distinction between economic power used to carry out or reasonably extend a function and economic power used entirely for other purposes."

American enterprises have become so big that their bureaucracies seem to differ from no other bureaucracies, particularly communist bureaucracies:

The fact that socialist and capitalist industrial organizations tend to converge in their organizational aspects is shocking to many American minds. . . . This is not to say that there will not be conflict between the Communist world and our own. But conflict will not be over economic formations of organizations.
(This is the last sentence of the book).

The reason for the likeness between American and Soviet organizations is "the similarity of the property-power dimension." "Both countries arrived at their power systems by approximately the same route." Both "evolved from a feudal matrix"; "the principal organizational difference between the two systems lies exactly there," in the fact that "in the Russian revolution the sweeping change was made by doctrinaire decision at the top" while "in the United States the decline of the personal property re-

lation to industry came by evolution from the bottom." The aspect of this which to most Americans is unattractive, having someone at the top tell you what to do, does not seem necessarily so to Mr. Berle:

Part of the strength and attractiveness of the Soviet System—attractiveness particularly to poverty-stricken countries which demand rapid evolution—is its capacity to move *against* the existing immediate desires of great masses of population while promising greater fulfillment at some later date.

On the subject of planning, toward which Mr. Berle reveals some bent: "There is even a modicum of coincidence in thinking between non-Communist and Communist philosophers." Public consensus seems to be able to operate in reverse without serious inconvenience.

Now this sort of thing is very hard to evaluate. Robert Taft used to say that he could see no difference between the political bureaucracy he lived with in Washington and the bureaucracy of the Pennsylvania Railroad for which he had worked as a young man. He did not, however, explain the extent to which the bureaucracy of the railroad was the same as the political one *via* the I.C.C. Likewise in technical matters the Soviet Union is imitating the United States trying to catch up with us and the similarity may lie in that simple fact. It is easy to pile up likenesses between ourselves and the Russians. Practically all of them are less than seven feet tall, as we are, and most of them are less than six feet tall. Few of them work more than 24 hours a day and the warm weather comes in the summer time and marriages take place between young men and women, just as with us. In deference to the law of gravity, they

pull on their pants one leg at a time, just as we do. A man who takes the elevator to the roof of the Empire State building and one who falls off the roof at the same instant will be converging for some seconds and at some instant will be equidistant from the earth but the convergence from the top and the bottom is not very significant. The whole value of such analogies lies in the degree of precision to which they are valid on the precise point of the analogy. The analogy between the organizational structures being imposed on Russians and the forms emerging in the United States with their different approaches and different goals cannot be adequately explored in five lectures.

There are unhappy little lapses in the book, such as the use of the term, forced saving, in a sense quite different from the commonly accepted technical one; the search for "actual cash" instead of "theoretical" savings, for this reason, results in the uncovering of 40 per cent of capital formation out of the theoretical cash of bank credit with no regard whatever for the source of the real saving. But the basic defect of the book is the lack of any conception of a public order. The Soviets started with a totalitarian statism; we are drifting toward one; there is no visible alternative. This is the basic error of the French Revolution which the 19th century accepted and acted on. There must be only individuals and the State. That genuine government can exist and function efficiently on lower levels is ruled out of court *a priori*. The fact that the corporations which the French Revolution abolished have reappeared even with a schizophrenic class-divided personality is not recognized for what it is, evidence that organization is as

natural on many levels as on the political level.

Such defects are very curious in a mind of the breadth and power of Mr. Berle's. His public consensus seems to be a cross between the *aestimatio communis* by which the just price was determined in a medieval market town and the *acceptatio* by which Suarez judged that an ordinance or regime lacking legitimate basis at first might acquire it through the consent of the governed. Power is nowhere defined (though illegitimate power is vividly described) but it is conceived to be close to authority (p. 169 seq.). But if au-

thority is the power of governing and coercing (*potestas gubernandi et coercendi*) and to govern is to guide something to its end (*gubernare est dirigere in finem*), then it is easy to see why the public consensus approves the use of power as a function. How a mind like Mr. Berle's could come so close to sound traditional notions and yet reveal only the faintest hint of the principle of subsidiarity which lies at the heart of his problem is difficult to grasp. This is a deliberately challenging book, one which will be much talked of. But Mr. Berle's past performances have set a standard which is very hard to maintain. This is not one of his better efforts.

PROTRACTED CONFLICT. By Robert Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty, Alvin J. Cottrell. Harper, New York. xvii, 203 pp. \$3.95

How sincere is the Soviet Union when it professes unqualified adherence to the "spirit of Camp David?" Already, doubts are being voiced here and there. The *Christian Science Monitor* remarked in its Oct. 7 edition: "The Soviet Union is playing a curious dual role in the United Nations diplomacy. On the one hand it professes an intense desire to end the cold war. On the other, it continues to wage the cold war with skill and subtlety."

Perhaps the contradictions in Soviet behavior are more apparent than real. Strausz-Hupe and his associates argue convincingly that deception is a necessary element of communist strategy in all phases of the "protracted conflict." Indirect aggression, which the *New York Times* on September 13 called "the most intractable" of all the post war problems facing the United Nations, also belongs here.

What is the "protracted conflict?" It expresses the essence of the conspiratorial aspect of the communist doctrine. The name has been suggested by Mao Tse-tung's book *On The Protracted War* which contains the most outspoken exposé of this strategy. The authors survey the principles

and techniques of protracted conflict in their various applications before and after World War II. The salient characteristics of the doctrine of protracted conflict are: total, objective, carefully-controlled methods and the constant shifting of the battleground, weapons systems and operational tactics for the purpose of confusing the opponent and keeping him off balance. The conclusions of this survey are frankly terrifying.

They suggest that, while we are preoccupied with the degree of liberalization of the regime under Stalin's successors, Khrushchev and company are quietly and confidently winning World War III. While Western democracies are ready to trod the most humiliating path to the Summit in quest of an elusive peace, peace for the communists is but the continuation of war with other means. While our policy makers are evolving schemes to contain communism, the communists are containing us.

This war which the communists are waging against us is both total and permanent. It affects the political, technological, economic, psychological, sociological and military spheres. Each *sputnik* launched by the Soviets is a milestone and a yardstick in the communist fight against the West. The communists use indirect, irregular, unconventional strategies, always stopping

short of an open clash until the achievement of ultimate victory has become feasible. This "graduated challenge" encourages temporizing on the part of the democracies.

As for prospects of future "summits," the authors are not very encouraging: "In the protracted conflict," they point out, "no single event, be it conference or battle, can be decisive."

The authors of this important study are no novices in analyzing Soviet behavioral patterns. They have, moreover, taken full advantage of the resources and facilities of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania where the study was conceived and developed. Their line of reasoning is not always flawless; occasionally factual errors detract from an argument. There is no index to facilitate reference. However, no one concerned with the current state of East-West relations will be able to disregard the book.

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SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION:

A Christian Approach. By T. B. Maston.
Macmillan, New York. 178 pp. \$3.50

CHRISTIANS IN RACIAL CRISIS: A

Study of the Little Rock Ministry. By
Thomas F. Pettigrew and Ernest Q.
Campbell. Public Affairs, Washington,
D. C. 196 pp. \$3.50

These two recent books examine the American Protestant conscience in the matter of race relations honestly and searchingly. In *Segregation and Desegregation* Dr. T. B. Maston, professor of ethics at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, adopts an idealistic approach. His contention is that the race question is primarily a moral and religious issue and that its solution therefore can be found only in Biblical teaching. Any sincere inquirer would be compelled to agree with Dr. Maston's thesis that there is no valid theological defense of segregation. That

his view is shared theoretically by all the major Protestant bodies in the United States, both in the South as well as in the North, he shows by abundant quotations from official utterances made by these bodies in endorsement of the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision. He finds Protestant practice, especially in the South, embarrassingly inconsistent with conviction. He admits that the universal Protestant system of "Jim Crow" churches in the South is the very antithesis of Protestant belief in fellowship and brotherhood. He does not, however, offer any adequate explanation of this "scandalous" dichotomy. If Dr. Maston really finds any consolation in the reflection that after all, "even if their churches opened their doors to Negroes, comparatively few would come," (p. 134) he ought logically to conclude that segregation, at least in the churches, is after all no real problem.

In *Christians in Racial Crisis*, Ernest Q. Campbell and Thomas F. Pettigrew, of Harvard University's Laboratory of Social Relations, have reported on a survey they made of the reactions of the Little Rock Protestant ministers to the school crisis in their city. They found a hard core of militant segregationists among the pastors of the smaller missionary churches. But the vast majority of the clergy looked on integration as morally right. Yet almost all of the city's ministers adopted a position of cautious passivity. As the crisis deepened, so did their silence. The authors of this book attribute the equivocal stand of the ministers to pressure from ardently pro-segregationist parishioners. The opposition of the Protestant laity had real teeth in it: decreased contributions, lowered attendance, and even the possibility of removal of an offending pastor.

These two books tell a story of Protestant failure in what is probably the nation's most critical social issue. But they tell something else that is equally significant: namely, that Protestant consciences are disturbed and are seeking ways to apply their Gospel beliefs more effectively to the problem of race relations.

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MIRRORS AND MASKS: *The Search for Identity.* By Anselm L. Strauss. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 186 pp. \$4

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: *A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior.* By Herbert H. Hyman. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 175 pp. \$4

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFILIATION: *Experimental Studies of the Sources of Gregariousness.* By Stanley Schachter. Stanford University Press, 141 pp. \$3.75

These three little volumes have much in common. They are small in size and large qualitatively. Each is a specialized study which could scarcely have general appeal yet each will be invaluable, perhaps even indispensable, to the student with some background in social psychology and a special interest in the socialization questions which are raised in these intriguing works. The broad framework within which each of these analyses is conducted is the *social act*, the behavioral situation $A \rightleftharpoons B$ in which A is influencing, while being influenced by, B. Since each analysis is to some extent a study in socialization, the emphases are more upon the ways in which A is affected by his social participation than the ways in which he "feeds-back" to society, through B, the effects of his socialization.

Mirrors and Masks is a study in identity. "Mirrors", of course refers to the reflective nature of self, so graphically described by C. H. Cooley as the "looking-glass self." "Masks" is not as familiar a concept, perhaps, but may be thought of as those sides of the self which one proffers to others. Within this concept of identity are analyzed: language-self-appraisals, interaction, transformations of identity, change and continuity (of identity), membership in groups, and biography.

Political Socialization pushes forward the notions so well advanced previously by Lazarsfeld, De Grazia, and others that the study of politics must be approached at the psychological as well as the social and cultural levels. The study begins with an overview of the ways in which psychological perspectives on politics are possible: studies of the elite, studies of the mass, studies of deviant groups and social movements, and finally the perspective selected by the author that . . . "humans must learn

their political behavior early and well and persist in it." (p. 17) The analysis of political socialization which follows considers sub-group differentiations, processes of socialization, agencies of socialization into politics and stability and change in attitudes and in the political order.

The Psychology of Affiliation is not the broadest of these three analyses, as the title might suggest. Strauss uses essay style exclusively, Hyman about half-and-half, and Schachter uses almost exclusively the guarded style of science which couches itself at every turn in the findings of experiment germane to the subject. Hence, his is the most limited and rigid of the three studies. Yet, in terms of a solid contribution to psychological science there can be no doubt that this study of the affiliative needs of man and their relationship to anxiety, and to biological and social needs falls little short of being a minor classic. Especially worthwhile is the investigation of ordinal position in the family which we have always thought to be highly significant without any really satisfying empirical data to back up our hunches.

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IN SEARCH OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION. By Elinor Castle Nef. University Publishers, New York. x, 253 pp. \$5

This is the first of three projected volumes to be published by the Elinor Castle Nef Foundation. It consists of letters and notes written by Mrs. Nef from 1935 until 1938, including her travels through this country, Europe, and Hawaii. Mrs. Nef, the deceased wife of John U. Nef of Chicago University, was a woman of penetrating insight and unusual sensitivity. Her observations on people, places, and cultural patterns she encountered in these years make pleasant, stimulating reading. They should serve to make the reader think about the social and spiritual significance of many institutions and customs he tends to take for granted.

THOMAS P. NEIL
Saint Louis University

SOCIAL ORDER

THE SCANLON PLAN. Edited by Frederick G. Lesieur. Wiley, New York. 173 pp. \$4.50

During the 1930's, when Mr. Joseph Scanlon was a member as well as an official of the United Steelworkers of America, he designed and installed a number of successful incentive programs in unionized companies, based on the principle of labor-management cooperation. In 1946 Mr. Scanlon left the union and joined the staff at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he spent the next ten years teaching and consulting on the installation of what has become known as "The Scanlon Plan." In 1956 Mr. Scanlon died and Mr. Frederick G. Lesieur, the editor of this book, took over Mr. Scanlon's work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The Scanlon Plan — A Frontier in Labor Management Cooperation is the best single source for an accurate description of the Scanlon Plan. It also gives the case histories of a number of companies where it was successfully applied in industry. Among those contributing articles to this publication are such well-known figures in the field of industrial relations as Clinton Golden, Douglas McGregor and George P. Shultz.

Scanlon's Plan can most accurately be described as a group incentive system based on the workers sharing in increased productivity through frequent cash bonuses. The plan implements many of the more recent findings of the social scientists regarding the nature of industrial incentives; in this it has much in common with certain other types of group cooperative bonuses.

Scanlon Plan advocates naturally feel that there are some advantages to their system over other systems of cooperative group incentives, and at several places in these pages these are enumerated. The fact is, however, that some of the other approaches have advantages over the Scanlon Plan, but these are not pointed out.

The book is a contribution to the literature on labor-management cooperation, on which, unfortunately, there is much too little written. Many of the ideas and techniques, which Mr. Scanlon developed (and as outlined in this study) can be used in con-

junction with other programs for cooperation. The procedure he has worked out for introducing a group incentive system when a union is present could be used effectively by others who are interested in cooperation. His approach to labor-management communications through employee advisory committees, as outlined in the book, is a system that has much to recommend it. The technique he developed for the use of a "Memorandum of Agreement" certainly would be a better approach to handling cooperative incentives with a union than through our present type of collective bargaining. The Scanlon Plan and other systems of labor-management cooperation do not lend themselves readily to the usual type of conflict-oriented collective bargaining. Mr. Scanlon recognized this fact and came up with the "Memorandum of Agreement" as an alternative method.

An important point made in the essays is that the key to success with this type of plan lies mainly in both sides somehow obtaining a proper "philosophy."

Although, as Scanlon and some of the others in this book point out, there are differences between the Scanlon Plan and other systems such as cash profit sharing, they are not as great as this book makes them. All such plans basically have much in common. The differences usually come in the form they assume. Scanlon's Plan is one which appeals to engineers and accountants because the plan is somewhat complex and a considerable amount of figuring is usually involved in arriving at the formulas.

Unfortunately, part of the book is devoted to an attempt to point out the superiority of the Scanlon Plan over certain types of profit sharing; these sections give the impression of individuals tilting with their images in a mirror. The fact is that the similarities of these two approaches to the labor problem are much greater than their differences.

By way of techniques, this book undoubtedly has much to offer those who wish to improve incentives and the union-management relations in their organizations.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING. By W. Brand. The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 438 pp. \$7.50

Professor Brand of the University of Leyden is one of those many authors who believe that the present state of knowledge of the economics of development does not warrant theoretical model-building. Nevertheless, working out from a model of growth can be useful, provided the author himself understands where speculation is outrunning present knowledge of processes. Indeed, the first of the three parts of his book suffers in particular from want of such a theoretical model. For while this first section's chapters talk intelligently about various aspects of economic development, one does not get the impression that a "process" is in fact unfolding before him.

The book breaks no new ground. Moreover, one could frequently wish a more extended discussion of the topic, coupled with more reference to the relevant literature. This limitation apart, one can warmly recommend the work for its splendid clarity and for the balanced judgment which one encounters throughout the study. Though long identified with the United Nations, Brand is capable of taking issue with positions which have been particularly dear to that body of experts, notably with a UN tendency to oversimplify problems of development and to overlook the absence of preconditions of development.

PHILIP LAND, S.J.
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RELIGION, POLITICS AND HIGHER LEARNING. By Morton White. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. xi, 140 pp. \$3.50

This provocative little volume takes its title from one of the ten essays comprising it. All but one of these essays have been published in various journals, but read in sequence they make an impact which might otherwise not be felt so sharply. An underlying theme is White's plea that philosophers "will revive their interest in subjects like the philosophy of law, of politics, of education, of religion, and of history without surrendering their interest in the

more remote questions of ethics, epistemology, logic, and metaphysics, and without sacrificing the exacting standards of these other disciplines."

The author's essays on an analytic philosophy of history and on historical inevitability are rather disappointing attempts at the philosophical inquiry he urges upon fellow philosophers.

THOMAS P. NEIL
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MENTAL HEALTH MANPOWER TRENDS. By George W. Albee. Basic Books, New York, xliii, 361 pp. \$6.75

This is the third volume in the series sponsored by the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health. This also is the first major study of the serious shortage of professional manpower in the mental health field.

Dr. Albee and his workers have done an exceptionally fine job. The present needs in the mental health field are quite demanding. For instance, the United States has one psychiatrist per 18,000 population, a total of 10,000 psychiatrists. Conservative estimates place current needs at 20,000. Of the 16,000 trained psychologists in the United States, only one-third are in clinical practice and directly concerned with the treatment of mental illness. Despite the fact that there are 80,000 social workers in the country, only a very small fraction of these are working in psychiatric fields. General hospitals staff one nurse to every 3 beds. Psychiatric hospitals have one nurse to every 53 beds. Dr. Albee closely follows the basic levels of education where these professional workers might be attracted to the mental health field. He also takes a very serious look at the present crisis of education in general. His conclusion is that unless recruitment into these professions is stepped up considerably, or unless increased basic research proves a simple medical therapy for mental illness, today's emergency situation will become a crippling crisis in the future.

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ISSUES IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WORK.

Edited by Alfred J. Kahn. Columbia University Press, New York. 354 pp. \$5

This book is a well coordinated series of essays on questions pertaining to professional social work in the United States. The current efforts to delimit and clarify the role of the profession, basic knowledge of the behavioral sciences and its use by the profession, issues related to non-professional social work, the recruitment, education and supervision of social workers and the organization and structure of social services, are treated expertly by the writers.

Since the profession draws much of its content from other service disciplines, it is not surprising that the question of specifics in social work should arise for continued discussion. No one questions the part that professional social work plays in the lives of thousands of American citizens, the influence that it has on the entire social economy. Caught between a competitive economy on the one hand in which only the strongest succeed and on the other hand the generous impulse of Americans to share the good things of life with others, professional social work must "aim to remain humane, never to lose its concern for the condition of man and flexible so that new needs do not escape it." But Americans may well ask what the profession through its social agencies is doing or aiming to do with such hard problems as the current wave of juvenile delinquency, the migrants to our border cities and states. Furthermore, dependent as the profession is on public funds and voluntary contributions through United Funds, more factual information on the massiveness and complexity of social problems must be placed before the general public so that people might know how the large sums of money are spent for health and welfare services.

Professional social workers are aware of these problems, courageous enough to spell them out as the writers of these essays do. The result cannot be anything but a stronger profession, particularly if social workers are as daring and untiring in their search for solutions to problems as they are in self analysis and criticism. The posi-

tive programs must follow and there is good reason to believe they will. Mr. Kohn and his essayists believe so too.

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ECONOMICS FOR PLEASURE. By G. L. S. Shackle. Cambridge University Press, New York, 269 pp. \$3.95

At last there is a book at hand for that perennial request: "Give me a good, simple book which will tell me what economics is all about; not too long either." As the dust jacket truthfully advertises, Professor Shackle's *Economics for Pleasure* relates "the essence of economics in good, plain English without diagrams or mathematics." The author has successfully put between two covers in very readable prose the central notions of economics: theory of value, partial and general equilibrium, distribution theory, saving-investment analysis, creation of money, fiscal operations, and the special case of international trade. In just a few pages, for example, he is able to contrast the Cambridge and Fisher Quantity Theories with satisfying lucidity. Similarly the marginal efficiency of capital, the multiplier and the Swedish *ex ante* and *ex post* concepts yield to Shackle's effortless exposition.

Teachers of economic principles will certainly find this book useful as supplementary reading material and perhaps even as a textbook for those terminal students who melt on the spot at the sight of a graph or a linear equation. In fact, anyone with good intention and several hours of concentration can profit from this systematic presentation of economic theory. Even though a skeptic or two may still question whether even Professor Shackle makes economic study pleasurable, there can be no doubt that his little book makes it more intelligible.

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**For Christmas gifts
—give SOCIAL ORDER**

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
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
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